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This issue of the Management Quarterly eni>arks on what amounts to 
a two-pronged, yet closely related, approach to some important and current 
personnel problems in the military service. The first three papers dis-
cuss rather innovative ideas concerning Perfonnance Evaluation Techniques. 
The first explores a revolutionary Perfonnance Appraisal concept present-
ing the results of an opinion survey here at NPS. The second distinguishes 
between fitness report review procedures in the Navy and junior officer 
counselling techniques. The third author confines his outlook to the 
Shipboard Perfonnance Evaluation, slightly more narrow in scope, but just 
as broadly applicable as the first two papers. 
The second three articles offer a Trilogy, considering the motiva-
tional aspects of the military from the standpoints of both recruitment 
and retention. The trio was researched and constructed as a sequential 
presentation and paper; and even though built around the Marine Corps as 
a model, is also considered of broad application and relevance in its 
scope. 
The reader may note that this edition is devoid of a "Reader Comment" 
section. This disappointing fact was the result of a lack of 11feedback11 
from the last issue. The long 11break11 between quarters obviously con-
tributed to this event. Again, your coJTHTients and criticisms are strongly 
solicited. The growth and success of this or any other publication de-
pend totally on the interests, desires and constructive criticisms of 
its readers. 
For the benefit of those avid readers of the Mana7ement Quarterly who may not have noticed, and also those students andaculty new to NPS, 
the addition of the Department Of The Na~t Seal to the cover marks a new 
phase in the evolution of this student pu lication. Official sanction 
for the issuance of the Management Quarterly as a Department Of The Navy 
Publication has been assured pending completion of certain administrative 
details concerning Navy Publication and Printing Regulations. It now 
remains for the coni>ined efforts of the Editorial Staff, the vast anx,unt 
of experienced and productive thought avail able from students, and faculty 
support to elevate the Management ~uarterly to a new level of excellence 
and notoriety befitting the Naval ostgraduate School. 
On a related but somewhat different matter, the following conmentary 
and proposals are offered for the readers• consideration and possible 
future action. In the course of preparing the Management Quarterly for 
this edition, approximately sixty (60) student papers were studied, ex-
amined and screened for publication. The editorial staff selected those 
which in the consensus of opinion best fit into thematic categories as 
well as maintaining currency and relevancy of content. It is important 
to note, however, that the six papers presented in this issue are not the 
only papers that were found to be of good quality. This fact prompts the 
following editorial conment. What happens to those literary efforts 
that, while excellent in their own right and applicable to Navy/Marine 
Corps policy fonnulation, were not published due to broad base appeal, 
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and space and thematic restrictions? Is it appropriate that students 
who effectively relate course materials to everyday application to Naval 
problem areas have their efforts consigned to some dusty repository? 
Here at NPS we find a wealth of talent and experience contained in a 
unique student body. Yet, it appears that student achievements are ex-
p~oited only to the extent that they are of thesis or dissertation level. 
In the fleet environment the Staff Study is the co111110n vehicle for com-
municating ideas and there is little need for exploring concepts or pro-
posals of thesis depth. Both the Navy and the Marine Corps are taking 
positive steps to improve the upward flow of conmunications. Why then, 
not make use of the efforts of students here at NPS, and establish a 
system for review, annotation and forwarding of worthwhile ideas to 
appropriate agencies at higher echelons? This is a particularly cogent 
consideration if one gives any credence to VADM Rickover's criticism 
that most officers receiving postgraduate training are seldom assigned 
to billets that allow application of their education. 
Lest the proposal be overstated, the following recommendations are 
submitted: 
1. That a Staff Review Board be established to consider meaningful 
student effort applicable to the Naval Service, as identified 
by the various instructors. 
2. That the Review Board be assigned the task of annotating student 
papers to insure accuracy, validity and academic excellence. 
3. That this board, upon completion of such a review on a quarterly 
basis, forward these student efforts to the Superintendent for 
approval and possible forwarding to the appropriate agencies. 
Under such a proposal, not only could the Navy/Marine Corps benefit 
from the receipt of additional relevant material, but students here at 
NPS would have the additional incentive to have their ideas reviewed for 
practical application rather than die after satisfying academic require-
ments. 











TOP MANAGEMENT POLICIES THAT HAVE MEANING 
FOR THE MANAGEMENT EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM 
AT NPS, MONTEREY 
by Wm. Howard Church 
Professor of Management, NPS 
r_, 
Having served on assignments involving development of policy reconmenda-
tions for the President and the Congress, the Secretary of the Navy,-for 
business organizations and for local levels of government, and the state of 
California, I can assure one and all that policy statements and guidelines 
that emanate from the office of the President and the Secretaries · of De-
fense and the Navy have received much thoughtful consideration on the part 
of those who conceived and set forth these concepts. We violate or disre-
gard these and related manageri-a l guidelines at our own peri 1. 
The management educational program was sold to the representatives of 
all bureaus and offices during a series of discussions over~ period of 
several months which were carried on by a CDR Richard Williams USN in PERS 
C and myself, then deputy management engineer for the Secretary. In the 
spring of 1 56 a formal conference was called and the total concept was 
sold in a few minutes• discussion. 
Obviously, our primary objective entailed bringing to the attention 
of Naval officers and senior civilians with ten to twelve years of service 
the managerial concepts and organizational approaches that would supply 
certain voids in their managerial experiences which would increase their · 
capability to evaluate the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of total command 
entities, chart constructive courses of action and increase their ability 
to constructively contribute to the attainment of worthy military and 
national objectives. When the management program was announced, the Sec-
retary of the Navy and the Chiefs of some of the Bureaus stated that the 
establishment of a Management School at Monterey was one of the most impor-
- tant events in contemporary Naval history. The management school was 
formally established on the campus at Monterey by order of the Chief of 
Naval Personnel in a letter which went out in June 1956. This school was 
set up as a separate entity apart from the Engineering School and the Line 
and Naval Science School. The reorganization of the Postgraduate School 
which took place in 1961 violated most of the understandings and concepts 
relating to the support, funding and direction of a management educational 
program and despite the constantly increasing popularity of the program 
among our officers, by no stretch of the imagination can anyone say that 
we have benefited by our amalgamation as a sub department in an engineering 
school. Currently, officers enrolled in management educational curricula 
exclusive of operations research, which is NOT Management but a TOOL of 
managers, will nuni>er a little over 300. This of course is by far the 
largest single program at NPS Monterey. 
Top management promulgates guidelines for administrative action fn 
order to achieve some reasonable consistency throughout the organization 
in the treatment of all problems having to do with the proper supervision 
of personnel and the wise usage of all other resources. Those of us who 
have participated in the development and issuance of such policy guidance 
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know that this is the result of serious and thoughtful analysis of problems 
and end objectives. Policies issued for the Defense establishment by the 
Secretary of Defense. have the backing of the Commander in Chief, the Presi-
dent of the United States ••. and obviously are not to be either ignored 
or taken lightly. 
The study of management practices over the years has revealed that 
the human element in management ends to respond in similar fashion to 
positive and negative stimuli. We expect those wearing the toga of leader-
ship to have a reasonable understanding of the basic psychological guide-
lines expressed in basic fonnat by the American Management Association in 
its listing of Ten Commandnents intended to promote hannonious relation-
ships among groups of people working together in the same organization with 
the hope of achieving certain common organizational objectives. 
In recent years, Douglas McGregor, Rensis Likert, Chris Argyris, John 
Pfiffner, Robert Blake, Jane Mouton, and many others, have spelled out in 
considerable detail the desirability of positive approaches to management 
that tend to unleash the great potential of human capability whenever 
management is wise enough and knOt1ledgeable nough to follow long tested 
precepts in creating the type of "cl imate11 that causes people to want to 
accomplish worthy organizational goals. We have hundreds of case studies 
of the amateur in management demonstrating his incapacity by resorting to 
authoritative and dictatorial techniques vice use of persuasion and partici-
pative approaches to managerial change. We have had too many of these ex-
amples and their cost is very high to all concerned. At one seminar session 
a senior captain remarked that when the military conmander has to resort 
to his authority status, he has just failed his leadership test. Obviously 
the same criteria are appropriate for all of us. 
Let's check our track record out against some of the top management 
policies that concern us and the way we manage here at home. Because many 
of our top bureaucrats in the defense establishment, both civilian and 
military, have frequently ordered changes in organizational relationships 
which have had a great impact on the personnel within these organizations, 
and often violated the contractual or verbal understandings with which 
they entered into employment, it became necessary to issue Presidential 
Executive Order 10988 to assure a participatory approach to the making of 
management changes. Now over 90 percent of the "blue collar" employees of 
the Navy, approximately 300,000, are covered under the provisions of E.O. 
10988, now superseded by the Nixon Executive Order 11491, in which manage-
ment is specifically directed not to make such changes without prior con-
sultation with the employee groups concerned. Long before the issuance of 
this order, good managers followed precepts and criteria which called for 
employment of participatory practices in the making of changes. For example, 
the third commandment of the AMA reads as follows: 
"No change should be made in the scope or responsibilities 
of a position without a definite understanding to that 
effect on the part of all persons concerned. 11 
Related to the above are convnandments numbers four and seven: 
"No executive or employee, occupying a single position 
in the organization should be subject to definite orders 









11No dispute or difference between executives or employees 
as to authority or responsibility should be considered too 
tri vi a1 for prompt and careful adjudication •11 
When the 1961 Board was convened to study organizational matters of 
the Naval Postgraduate School, it adopted a policy of no co1T1nunication 
with anyone about its study or proposed changes until after the report 
was submitted. The report involved elimination of the Management School 
and the Line and Naval Science School as separate entities apart from the 
Engineering School. It corrbined these two dissimilar organizations and 
reduced them to departments under the same organizational procedures es-
tablished for the administration of an Engineering School despite the 
fact that different student bodies and different educational objectives 
were fnvol ved. The senior professors in both departments concerned were 
never brought into this proposal either before or after the submission of 
the report to the Admiral, the faculty and BUPERS. This 11railroad 11 job 
has hurt the operation of the management educational program for over a 
decade and has also left its scars on the faculty and staff of the then 
Line and Naval Science School now know as the Department of Government 
and Humanities. The usual principle involved in the conbination of depart-
ments or activities is that one conbines like or homogeneous activities 
together -- not dissimilar activities. 
On 10 February 1971 Admiral McNitt announced the consolidation of the 
Department of Operations Analysis with the Department of Business Adminis-
tration and Economics to be headed by the Chairman of the Department.of 
Operations Analysis. This action cannot be said to have been accoq>lished 
through any participative process involving faculties of either department 
and raises but does not ans~er many questions. Some of these questions 
related to lack of homogeneity in purpose, objective, methodology, philoso-
phy, course content and differences in approaches to teaching adults • 
In 1970, a Visiting Co1T1nittee h aded by two very distinguished and 
qualified Deans in Management and Public Administration pointed out weak-
nesses in the staffing of the 11management11 faculty and strongly recommended 
that the school abandon the recruiting approach utilized for engineering 
and technical faculty in order that we could employ an adequate number of 
fully qualified senior faculty members. We are short handed in basic areas 
of organization and management admi ni strati ve analysis, pub 1 i c financial 
management, public personnel administration, industrial engineering, re-
source management and management policy. These are key areas in management 
education that are not aided by the fact that our faculty suddenly took a 
numerical leap from approximately 27 military and civilian and part time 
instructors to 82. 
The Visiting Committee report specifically urged the administration 
of NPS, Monterey to abandon its penny pinching approach to the development 
of the management faculty on board. We have recruited some fine young men 
who need opportunities for research and experience in the managerjal areas 
in which our officers will spend the rest of their careers. Other faculty 
members who have often been carrying overloads need opportunities for 
refurbishing and updating their capabilities. 
Chiseled over the entrance to one of the state capitol buildings in 
Sacramento are the words: 11B RING ME MEN TO MATCH MY MOUNTAINS. 11 We 
have the men! We have one of the world's finest student bodies at 
Monterey. I have attended many management conferences in ll1Y lifetime, 
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and from the standpoint of capability and motivation, I would stack our 
officers up against any group of men from private industry I have seen. 
Many of these men have placed their lives on the line for their country. 
These men deserve the best educational talent that money can btzy not only 
because of their personal intrinsic worth but because they face one of 
the world's toughest challenges in management, namely the wise and econom-
ical utilization of resources to safeguard America and the free world. 
They are al so entitled to an el i ghtened appro·ach to the management of the 
school they attend. The Visiting Committee indicated the management 
faculty must be able to communicate with an administration that has empathy, 
understanding and capability in the management area, that it should have a 
chance to develop its own style, etc. At this point in time it is diffi-
cult to see how the goals and the needs outlined by the Visiting Conmittee 
are being implemented. 
Currently, efforts are being directed toward analysis of goals and 
objectives within the two departments. If such goals and objectives are 
to be ultimately checked out by the users as well as by the experienced 
Deans aforementioned, they can have real value; but there is also the 
al ready perceived danger of committees being fonned without .the requisite 
knowledge of the needs of the users, coming up with so wide a scope of 
objectives that their implementation may become impractical. For some time 
officers have complained of spinning their wheels taking courses which to 
them appear not to have real pay off value. Officers making these complaints 
are often senior men who have demonstrated capability to handle anything 
thrown at them, academically or otherwise. Again, the Visiting Committee 
warned us to avoid trying to duplicate the di verse offerings of some pri-
vate and public educational institutions. The Navy needs a balanced prod-
uct from the educational and experience backgrounds it affords the officer. 
The individual whose background is top heavy with mathematical and or 
engineering skills is inadequately equipped to cope with the human and 
resource problems of today and tomorrow. The basic reasons for the estab-
lishment of a management educational program was on the spot experience 
that demonstrated that the rotation system of varied operational tours 
ashore and afloat cannot assure us of having a cadre of officers adequately 
steeped in current management theory and practice before being pl aced in 
positions involving significant decision making and high level supervisor-
ial responsibility. We are not only interested in the biggest bang for 
the buck, we are interested in the development of a management climate in 
the Defense establishment which will be truly dedicated to the goals enun-
ciated by President Nixon and the Defense Secretaries. 
Now let us take a look at some of the top policies again: 
The Nixon Administration has issued a statement on HUMAN GOALS sub-
scribed to by the secretaries and military heads of the Department of 
Defense and the three military departments. These objectives are appli-
cable equally to both military and civilian personnel: 
110ur nation was. founded on the principle that the individual 
has infinite dignity and worth. The Department of Defense, 
which exists to keep the nation secure and at peace, must 
always be guided by this principle. In all that we do, we 
must show respect for the serviceman and civilian employee 













The defense of the nation requires a wel 1 trained force, 
military and civilian, regular and reserve. To provide such 
a force we must increase the attractiveness of a career in 
Defense so that the serviceman and the civilian e~loyee will 
feel the highest pride in himself and his work, in the uniform 
and the military profession. 
THE ATTAINMENT OF THESE GOALS REQUIRES THAT WE STRIVE •.• 
To attract to the defense service people with ability, 
dedication, and capacity for growth •.• 
To provide opportunity for everyone, military and 
civilian to rise to as high a level of responsibility as 
his talent and diligence will take him; etc ..•. " 
Let us now look at some of the specific Civilian Personnel Goals of 
this Administration and previous administrations: 
11To enhance opportunities for employment and development of 
veterans, especially those recently discharged • 
To promote personal cotmritment o progressive personnel 
management among managers so as to make Navy and Marine 
Corps activities model employers. 
To promote understanding of and conmitment to effective 
leadership and management echniques so as to enhance 
productivity th rough motivation of the work force and 
organizational effectiveness . 
To strive by advance planning to manage changes in the 
work force so as to maximize effectiveness and balanced 
capabilities within available resources, and to minimize 
disruptive effects upon individual and co11111unity inter-
ests. 
To advance the Department of the Navy's leadership 
position in labor management relations through con-
structive implementation of Executive Order No. 11491, 
with particular attention to participative consultation 
and information sharing. 
To provide challenging and rewarding career programs so 
as to attract, retain and continuously improve the caliber 
of needed talent, especially in critical occupations such 
as scientific, engineering and managerial fields. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
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To develop civilian personnel information systems adequate 
to meet Navy and Marine Corps managers• needs and, in con-
fonnance with presidential and Civil Service Conmission 
directives, to make periodic evaluations of the effective-
ness of civilian manpower management throughout the Depart-
ment." 
/s/ John H. Chafee, SecNav 
/s/ Thos. H. Moorer, CNO 
/s/ L. Chapman, Corrmandant, 
U. S. Marine Corps. 
Since programs in management do not die out with the changes in 
political administrations, let us consider the key goals of the Johnson 
administration to improve manp<Mer management, both military and civilian: 
1. Attract and retain the nuni>er of personnel required in 
_each skill and professional category. 
2. Train, assign and utilize each individual to utilize his 
highest potential. 
3. Compensate and reward each individual in accordance with 
his contribution, maintaining the principle of comparabil-
ity with private enterprise as fully as practicable. 
4. Maintain living and working conditions which are condu~ive 
to high standards of health, morale and performance. 
Again, our great challenge in management education at NPS, Monterey is to 
increa~e the capability of our officers to handle the varied and di ffi-
cult managerial and manpower problems of today and tororr<M. Military 
turnover alone costs the taxpayer well over one billion dollars a year 
and possibly much more in the fonn of intangible assets. Much of this 
can rightfully be attributed to management1s self-inflicted wounds. We 
must become more adept in structuring and maintaining the kind of mana-
gerial climate that will capitalize on the ability and talent of all 
those who can contribute. We must also weigh the value and impact of 
course content in terms of its real utility to the user throughout his 
career. He is the one who goes from here with the gauntlet in hand and 
who must often perform under adverse circumstances. We haven1t really 
accomplished our mission here unless we can instill in him the values 
and concepts that will encourage him to work hard in the achievement of, 






























"RATE YOUR SUPERVISOR" 
PROGRAM 
by J. G. Bloomvr. 
The a.u.:tholt. explo.lr.e6 a. Jtevo.t.u.ti.onaJr.y pe1t.60Junanc.e. 
applt.a,Uai. conc.e.pt and pJtUenu tite JtUuU:.6 06 a.n opin.i.on 
h wr.vey c.ondu.ct.ed he1t.e a:t the USNPGS. 
J. G. BLOOMER, LT, USN; B.S., 1965, U. S. Naval 
Academy; Candidate for M.S. in Management. 
Tvun pa.peJr. hubmU:.ted to P1t.06eAh01t. El6tvr. 601t 
PVL601111el Pe1t.60Junanee Evai.ua:t-i.on, WJ 4114. 
Introduction 
The United States Navy is presently confronted with a turbulent time 
marked by loss of national image, possible discontinuance of the draft, 
declining retention rates, drug problems and many other problems that have 
caused officers at all levels to search for some solutions. The identifi-
cation of the problem is easy; it is people, young people with new sets 
of values, people who are generally better educated than any. past genera-
tion and people who have grown up in a world that only faintly resent>les 
the one that existed only twenty years ago. Their dissatisfaction can be, 
and is, explained in 100 ways by people far better qualified than I, but 
perhaps an easy answer is that they have grown up with their lower needs 
satisfied and have moved a few steps up Maslow's hierarchy of needs.fl 
Whatever the specific and multivariate causes, it is clear that it 
is time for those of us in the Navy to take a very hard look at our 
personnel management practices if we are to handle the problems of today. 
Unfortunately, an objective look at these practices reveals that .they 
have essentially remained static through these years of enonnous worlcwide 
change. Only recently have any changes of significance occurred and, in 
ITlY opinion, these changes are leading toward a more modern leadership that 
our youth may find a bit more satisfying. However, the efforts of one 
/1 A.H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New York: Harper & 
Bros. ,-1954), chaps. 4 & 5. 
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Chief of Naval Operations is not enough. Every officer must continue to 
look for changes that might benefit the Navy of tomorrow. 
My studies at the Naval Postgraduate School have convinced me that ~ 
some adaptation of participatory management could provide the most pro-
mising approach for management improvement in the Navy. We must accept 
that today's modern ships and equipment depend as much on the educated 
technician as on the officer and that whether we admit it or not, the 
young technician has a degree of expert power with which we must deal. 
If we are wise, we can fonn an unbeatable team, but some changes are 0 
going to have to be made, particularly if we are to retain the quality 
technicians we must have to serve the equipments of the future. The 
officer of today must, as in the past, be a good leader, but he must be 
a trained and capable manager as well. He must learn to open the lines 
of communication down and up, operating through his men t<Mard the common 
goals of his organization. He must ·1earn to accept advice readily from 
his men. In short, many traditional views of the officer/enlisted inter-
face are going to have to change. 
I recognize that the leadership of the Navy cannot, and will not, 
change in a day, nor would I really want to see some of our great tradi-
tions cast aside. We cannot, however, afford to delay too long learning • 
the lessons that industry accepted long ago. 
I stumbled across an article on a new program being tried by Essa 
Research and Engineering Company that may be applicable to a few of our 
problems. The program consists of a comprehensive five-page fonn fil"fed 
out by the employees evaluating their irrurediate supervisor. The forms 
are then submitted anonymously to a computer center where they are quan-
tified and the results returned directly to the supervisor for his sole . 
use. The employees are briefed on the forms, program and goals prior to 
the rating process. Almost 90% of the supervisors reported that they 
take the reports seriously and have attempted changes in their leadership 
techniques ./2 
I felt that an adaptation of this program held great promise for 
use by the Navy and might succeed in two areas: (1) It would provide 
feedback to the officer from Petty Officers who might be reticent to con-
front the officer directly, but may have significantly more experience 
ih a particular field. This would provide excellent feedback to the 
junior officer who arrives aboard his first ship with more responsibilities 
than he can list and may not even be aware that he needs help. (2) 
Likert's studies indicate that the feeling of participation in improving 0 
the management of the unit may have a significant effect on enlisted 
morale and encourage a more active role in the management eam./1, 
Even though I was enthusiastic over the adaptation of such a program 
for use by the Navy, I soon learned that many of 1f1Y fellow officers were 
not. In an attempt to discover whether such a program would meet general 
acceptance or rejection, I prepared and sent 1100 survey questionnaires 
/2 P. W. Maloney and J. R. Hinrichs, 11A New Tool for Supervisory 
Self-Development," in Perfonnance Appraisal, ed. Thomas L. Whisler and 
Shirley F. Harper (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962), 
pp. 341-348. 
/3 Rensis Likert, New Patterns of Management (New York: McGraw-
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5. If you found such reports adverse, would you attempt any changes 
in your leadership techniques? 
Yes 72.7% No O Don•t Know 27.3% 
NOTE: This question elicited many comments, and in most cases the 
11Don1t Know11 answer is a qualified 11Yes11• That is: after consideration 
of the source, how the program was run, whether they were isolated reports 
or a trend, etc. 
6. Do you feel that Commanding Officers might gain by having a similar 
evaluation made of them by their junior officers? 
Yes 76.4% No 14.0% Don' t Know 9.6% 
NOTE: Another response that was unexpected by the writer, but it 
is interesting to note that many who had held command commented that this 
feedback would have been especially useful to them. 
7. Do you feel that such feedback might have been of help to you at 
any time in your career? If Yes, when? 
Yes 87.9% No 12.1% 
NOTE: The 11when11 in this case was generally as a LT and below, but 
many responded that it would help at any time. 
8. Do you feel that enlisted raters would conscientiously attempt 
an accurate evaluation of their superior officer? 
Yes 74.2% No 7.2% Don't Know 17.6% 
NOTE: Most of the II Don't Know" res pons es referred to the fact that 
some would and some wouldn't, which of course is probably valid. The 
question should have been stated, 11 ••• that most enlisted raters .• 11 • Also, 
several people took me to task over the teriii"'superior" officer, which is 
an example of traditional verbiage we would do well to delete from our 
modern vocabulary. 
9. If such an evaluation system were adopted by the military 
services, do you feel that the raters should be restriced to: 
No restrictions {all levels of subordinates) 58.3% 
Petty Officers only 34.6% 
Other 7 .1 % 
NOTE: The 110ther 11 in this case generally was accompanied by comments 
suggesting a graded grading system; that is, officers and CP01s grade CO & 
XO while Chiefs and First Class rate their Department Head, or some similar 
groupings. There is certainly some merit to this idea, if only to reduce 
the amount of paperwork. 
Part II 
If such an evaluation system were adopted by the service, how well 
could your enlisted men have rated you on the following? 
The rater was asked to put a number in the blank next to a list of 
traits where the numbers meant: (1) Highly capable, (2) Capable, (3) 









NOTE: After compiling all of the numbers for each trait and finding 
a mean grade, I realized that the mean did not offer a clear picture of 
the actual results. Therefore I have regrouped the numbers.into High 
(l or 2) and low (3 or 4) and then provided the high percentage. Finally, 
I have reordered the list in order of those percentages. 
Rank Trait High % 
l. Has the respect of his men 97.8% 
2. Sets good example 97.7% 
3. Has confidence in his men 91. 8% 
4. Forcefulness 90.5% 
5. Aggressive 84.0% 
6. leadership 83.0% 
7. Most preferred type of leader 81.2% 
8. Decisiveness 00.0% 
9. Tact 76.6% 
10. Honesty 76.2% 
11. Hard worker 72.5% 
12. Maturity 68.4% 
13. Scared of higher authority 60.5% 

















Conceptually, I had intended to quantify the survey conments both 
pro and con in this section of "1Y paper. However, a review of the 
conments made led me to the conclusion that direct quotations wouldyi.eld 
the reader a much clearer view of the reasoning and emotions of those who 
contributed their time to give me over 100 pages of remarks. The follow-
ing sections are therefore presented with only a classification sentence. 
A. Those who added comments in favor of the program did so for a 
wide variety of reasons and with differing degrees of enthusiasm. The 
following are samples. All quotes are preceded by the rank of the 
respondent. 
lCDR 11Many times some of the troops have privately 'evaluated' me in 
limited categories in the past. Such evaluation would carry more weight 
and be far more 'available' with such a system as that discussed." 
LT "One prime advantage of this, is that it would give the enlisted 
man an opportunity to consider the personal traits and motivations of 
his superiors." 
LT "Such a system might encourage leaders to motivate and instruct 
rather than drive and tell." 
LT "Even this report would not be necessary if there were better re-
lationships (human) between officers and subordinates. Organization and 
discipl i ne are necessary but caste systems are not. I think this system, 
honestly approached and accepted as sincere criticism, can help establish 
close honest relationships which would lead to better communication." 
lCDR "Such a program would generate violent opposition, but could pro-
vide very valuable information once it had passed through the initiation 
period. 11 
11 
LT 11It 1s such a good idea that I doubt if it will go through. Many 
higher ranking officers don't care to hear about such nonsense." 
LT 11The more mature, conscientious PO's have va1id criticisms which 
they shou1d be encouraged to voice; the method out1ined in the introduc-
tion would likely provide that encouragement." 
LT 11! have experienced this type of evaluation by subordinates pre-
viously as an instructor. I feel it would be of great value, especially 
to the division officer and to a lesser degree, more senior officers." 
LCDR "I am ex-enlisted and with adequate explanation to EM's this 
system would work well. 
B. Those answering "No" also varied widely in reasoning, but in 
many cases they were more adamant. 
LT 11! believe face-to-face discussions are more productive. 11 
CDR "Undermines discipline. A crutch for poor leaders who don't have 
the ability to conmunicate with men, or to accurately comprehend what is 
going on around them." 
LT r.1t is difficult enough aboard ship to instill in a junior officer 
that the principles of good management are best served by a professional 
relationship with his men rather than a friends hip basis. This evaluation 
would only serve to promote the latter." 
LCDR "There is just too much danger in the proposal for all concerned 
for the few benefits that might be realized." 
LCDR "A good officer knows how his men feel about him. The officer 
who does not know is unlikely to be affected, pro or con, by written 
evaluations. 11 
LCDR "There is enough breakdown in authority in the modern Navy with-
out open criticism by subordi nates." 
LCDR "I feel peer group pressure or influence would greatly prejudice 
the non-rated opinion. Senior Petty Officers would be more capable of 
fai r eva l uati ans. 11 
LT "The main reason I said No, is that I feel the evaluation would 
be degraded to a grievance session .•. 11 
LT "This system of evaluation would tum into a popularity contest 
between junior officers. 11 NOTE: This comment was the most conman 
reason given for the negative response. 
LCDR "Personally, such a syst em in the military service goes against 
l11Y grain. 11 
LCDR "God, when is this liberalism ever going to cease?" 
C. However, whether the responses were pro or con, there were 
several fears of misuse of the program and concern for the ultimate 
effects. 
LT "Once comments are noted on paper, the 'Navy way' ensures the 













LT 11Strongly feel that feedback should be confidential and not avail-
able to superiors." 
LCDR "I feel a junior officer is very formable in his early years and 
should be guided only by his seniors, not his juniors. 11 
LCDR "The evaluation would seem to put too much emphasis on molding the 
junior officer to suit the needs of subordinates, when in fact the molding 
should come from the top -- providing of course that the superior is 
capable himself and takes advantage of opportunities to observe the junior 
officer. 11 
LCDR "One wou1 d tend to cater to the wishes and whims of subordinates 
if only to protect his ego when he receives their 'biased' evaluations." 
LCDR "Feedback should be welcome in any fonn. It enables one to see if 
points of emphasis are coming across. It should be entirely optional on 
the part of the Bllisted men and should not go through any chain of com-
mand, i.e., leading PO's or Chiefs. 11 
LCDR "The typical junior officer is too sensitive to the opinions of his 
subordinates. By trying to please all of them, having no way to differen-
tiate between serious comment and sarcastic, he could ruin himself in his 
own image. He could lose whatever self-confidence he had built up. 11 
LCDR 111 fee 1 the success of such feedback would depend upon whether 
the recipient could take criticism, and if he could, effect changes where 
necessary. There is a danger of an impersonal system such as that des-
cribed becoming a routine, meaningless exercise if the recipient cannot 
corrmunicate its worth by viewing the feedback seriously and making 
changes where necessary. 11 
LT "Problem in maintaining anonymity comes up when the officer has 
very few subordinates. May need to propose a system in which evaluations 
are only made when the officer has, for example, five or more subordinates . " 
NOTE: Some form of this corrment was often made and it is probably true 
that maintaining true anonymity in a small unit would be difficult, if 
not impossible. 
CDR "The evaluation should not be forced upon the subordinates. It 
should be optional whether or not you evaluate your senior. 11 
C. Many of those most violently opposed to the program felt enlisted 
men were incapable of judging their perfonnance. 
LT "Since seniors have a hard time evaluating juniors and our fitness 
reports are a highly controversial topic, don't you think an uneducated 
individual would have even a more difficult time efficiently evaluating 
seniors?" 
LCDR 111 don't feel a PO is qualified to tell me how to do IT\Y job!" 
LT 11I do not believe that enlisted men, in general, have the back-
ground ta evaluate my perfonnance, since personnel management is only 
part of IT\Y job as a Naval officer. Most could not evaluate IT\Y shiphandling 
ability since most have no experience. They could not evaluate IT\Y material 
and financial management since they do not have the training I have, etc., 
etc. 
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LT 11! do not feel most younger P01s and non-rated men would be honest 
and objective in making out such evaluations. Also I feel it would be 
difficult to keep these evaluations from the concerned offi_cer 1s superiors. 11 
LT 11I believe that the average sailor working for a young JO is not 
mature enough to make the type of comments which would be beneficial. 11 
LCDR "I t hink the whole idea is a bunch of ----! If you can subject 
the EM's to the same pressures, hold them to the same responsibilities, 
etc., THEN they are in a position to rate him objectively, and not before. 11 
E. Several respondents, not necessarily against trying the program, 
expressed doubt that the program was necessary or would be of any real 
value if adopted. 
LCDR "A good manager should be able to evaluate his policies by the 
results of his efforts or by another means of feedback. Subordinate 
evaluations are a nice thought but probably useful only if the superior 
has really lost contact with his subordinates. If this has happened, 
chances are the evaluation won't help matters." 
LT "The junior officer who is concerned enough to care what his subord-
inates think of lim does not need such a device. 11 
LCDR "Any JO who does not get sufficient feedback in this area is not 
worth his salt anyway. Sounds like just another poor attempt at leader-
ship by the numbers. 11 
F. Some took the time to offer their thoughts on the implementation 
or alteration of the actual program and several expressed their desire . 
for quite another type of feedback. Though perhaps not entirely applicable 
to this study, I have offered a few which seemed representative. 
LCDR "Believe program might be. initiated on a trial basis at selected 
stations or ships. Results of initial evaluations would probably give 
good indication of the type of questions that will get the most thoughtful 
response . Trial stations should probably be at installations where 
majority of enlisted evaluators are more mature petty officers. 11 
LCDR 11If such a program were implemented, all petty officers and officers 
should be subject to it so that no one feels exempt or immune to criticism." 
.. 
0 
LT "Although such a survey would be a valuable tool in and of itself, 
I think it would prove most valuable as a starting point, leading to open 0 
verbal dialogue between leaders and their immediate subordinates . " 
LT 11Feel that periodic (frequent!) reports of a similar nature from 
above would be of great value. JO's need an answer to 'I wonder what 
the Old Man thinks of 111.Y perfonnance recently?' . 11 
CDR 11A much better method of evalu ation could be obtained through per-
iodic meeting with your boss, where he tells you how you have been per-
fonning. I have never had such a meeting (16 years) . 11 
G. Very little enthusiasm for the program was reflected in the 




A MARINE "Never figured it would be good policy to let the 'lunatics' 
run the asylum! It is not necessary to be popular (although a fair man 
probably will be), only to be competent and have the interest of his 
men at heart. Call it anything you like, but in order to be successful 
in combat the Military has to be a benevolent dictatorship! 11 
Every effort has been made to impartially excerpt the quoted comments, 
without distorting the intended meanin~. While they are by no means in-
clusive ( certainly not of the extremes), they do reflect the attitudes 
of the great majority. 
Con cl us ions 
The results of this survey would be wasted if conclusions were not 
presented, but they would be better wasted, than used as a definitive 
proof that a military 11Rate Your Supervisor11 program would be successful 
in the Armed Services. For one thing, it should be stated that the 
statistics are based on approximately 1/3 of the 1100+ fonns sent. 
Secondly, they are taken from a selected sample, namely students at the 
Naval Postgraduate School, and ~ not be truly representative of the 
entire Navy population. 
The results of the survey do indicate two points fairly conclusively: 
(1) There is a general concern for improving officer/enlisted lines of 
communication. (2) The overwhelming majority of respondents indicated 
a high degree of respect for the judgment of the enlisted man of today. 
While neither of these points come as any great shock to most officers, 
they do indicate a departure from the thinking of a few years ago. 
The statistics and comments offer many other tempting generaliza-
tions, but only one firm conclusion; that the "Rate Your Supervisor" 
program does merit further consideration for adaptation and use by the 
Navy. I would propose that this consideration be in the form of a 
thorough study conducted by qualified behavioral scientists, under the 
auspices of the Bureau of Naval Personnel. Should such a study be under-
taken, I feel that the comments. from this survey would provide excellent 
guidance for making the program successful as a tool of Navy management 
and acceptable to the great majority of officers . 
The following is a list of the conditions most often noted as essen-
tial for acceptance and success. 
l. First, the questionnaire must be so constructed that it offers 
feedback that is, in fact, helpful and that can be considered by the 
officer to be valid. 
2. The program must pro vi de for comprehensive briefing of the 
raters on the program and its goals. 
3. There should be a pilot program conducted with both ashore and 
afloat units. (Different questionnaires may be required and the results 
may not be worthy of the costs involved.) 
4. If the three above conditions are met and the results presented 
to all Navy units, many felt the program would be accepted by the great 
majority, though many others felt that the actual use of the program 
should still be optional. In other words, it should be a too1 to be 
used by the manager at his discretion. 
5. Finally, many expressed concern that non-rated people should be 
excluded from the program or that a bracketed system be used, in which 
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certain rates shoul d evaluate certain ranks. I feel this concem could 
be most easily eliminated by making these details optional also. 
While neither this, nor any other program, will be a panacea for 
all the personnel problems in the Navy of today, it m~ very well be 
a big step in the right direction. Certainly the results of this survey 
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SUBORDINATE EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE 
Many industries have recently adopted a new tool for management self-
improvement called .the 11Rate Your Supervisor" program. It consists of a 
yearly comprehensive evaluation fonn filled out by the subordinates of a 
specific manager, and submitted anonymously to that manager for his sole 
use {similar to NPS Student Evaluation of Instructors). Surveys of the 
managers who have participated in this program have indicated that they 
have found such feedback a significant aid for their own self-improvement. 
The purpose of this survey is to discover whether the students of 
the NPS feel that the military officer might be benefited by a program 
such as this, in which he is evaluated by his subordinates, with the 
ratings submitted directly to him solely for his own use. 
PART I. Please indicate your feelings or opinions on the questions below 
by an X in the appropriate block. 
l. Do you feel such a periodic survey by his enlisted men would be a 
significant help to the junior officer? 
Yes ___ Maybe ___ No ___ If No, go to Part III. 
2. Shaul d such a program be restricted to the junior officer only? 
Yes ___ No. ___ If No, what levels should it be restricted ):o, 
if any? _________________ Don't know_-__ 
3. Do you feel" ·that such a system would have a significant effect on 
enlisted morale? 
Yes ___ No ___ Don't know __ _ 
4. If you were rated by your subordinates, would you consider these 
reports: 
Quite seriously __ _ Seriously --- Casually __ _ 
Other (specify) ______________ _ 
5. If you found such reports adverse, would you attempt any changes 
in your leadership techniques? 
Yes ___ No ___ Don't know __ _ 
6. Do you feel that Commanding Officers might gain by having a similar 
evaluation made of them by their junior officers? 
Yes ___ No ___ Don't know __ _ 
7. Do you feel that such feedback might have been of help to you at any 
time in your career? If Yes, when? (specific rank or billet) 
Yes ___ No ___ When. ________________ _ 
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8. Do you feel ti-at enlisted raters would conscientiously attempt an 
accurate evaluation of thefr superior officer? 
Yes___ No___ Don I t know. __ _ 
9. If such an evaluation system were adopted by the military services, 
do you feel that the raters should be restricted to: 
No restriction (all levels of subordinates} ---Petty officers only ___ Other (specify} _________ _ 
PART II. IF such an evaluation system were adopted by the service, how 
well coul~ your enlisted men have rated you on each of the following? 
Please put a nunber by each word or phrase, where the numbers mean your 
enlisted men would be: 1} Highly capable, 2} Capable, 3) Maybe capable, 
4) Not capable, of rating you on this trait. 
Leadership Honesty 
__ _,Tact Forcefulness 
----'Decisiveness Maturity 
___ Scared of higher authority __ ....,Hard worker 
___ Apple polisher Has the respect of his men 
__ ....,Sets good example Aggressive 
___ Has confidence in his men Most preferred type of leader 
Others (any traits you may feel your enlisted personnel might have be~n. 
uniquely able to evaluate) _________________ _ 
PART III. If you have answered No to question 1., would you please 
comment on your reasons? 
PART IV. 
Rank Service Name (optional) ------ ----- -------
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IS NOT ENOUGH 
• 
b!f M. H. Lo!f 
The a.uthoJt. CVUVJ6 a. .&haJr.p cliA.t..i.nction be;t:ween 
6-ltnU.6 Jt.epo !Lt Jte. view and j u.ni.JJJt. o 6 oic.e.Jt coWt.6 e.lli.ng, 
plr.U en.ti.ng butovati..ve pMpoei ai..l:i. 
M. H. LOY, LCDR, USN; B.S., 1963~ Tulane University; 
Graduate M.S. in Management in June 1971. 
T eJun pa.pe.Jt .6 ub mltted to P Jr.O 6 U.6 o It.. Gµ:h enei 6oJL 
Pell.6onne.l Motivation, MN 4115. 
Introduction 
Recently, a new personnel policy was promulgated by BuPers Notice 
1611 of 16 July 1970. 11Commandi ng Officers are to show fitness reports 
to Lieutenants and below." The reason for this is stated as two-fold: 
I. It would allow junior officers, whose duty stations preclude 
access to BuPers, knowledge of their report status. 
II. Co111nanding Officers would be forced to discuss the report with 
their juniors and, hence, work improvement would result. 
A recent 11Z-Gram11 has removed the rationale for the first reason. 
Officers are now able to receive copies of their own fitness reports 
simply by writing BuPers. The only remaining reason for a junior/senior 
"show" session then must be, according to Notice 1611, 11 •• • to provide 
the reporting senior with an exceptional leadership opportunity to 
strengthen junior/senior communications and mutual understanding ..•• 
this should result in a higher level of job satisfaction, increased moti-
vation and improved perfonnance. 11 
I intend to show that discussing a perfonnance evaluation with a 
junior is necessary, but that this discussion, by itself, is a very poor 
way to "increase moti vation 11 and provide for "mutual understanding. 11 
Another evaluation/counselling/motivating process, or perfonnance 
appraisal system, will be proposed. 
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Effectiveness of Present Navy Perfonnance Appraisal Policy 
Perfonnance appraisal consists of two objectives:/1 
I. Infonnation storage for administrative action TPerfonnance 
evaluation) 
A. Promotion 
B. Job Placement 
C. Point up group weaknesses to direct training programs. 
II. Work Improvement 
The present fitness report serves adequately in accomplishing the 
infonnation storage objective. That it could be improved is moot, 
however we cannot argue that it does work as an infonnation storage 
device. 
Performance appraisal's second objective, work improvement, 11is 
the development of skills rathe't than the collection of infonnation. 11/2 
That the new show process will result in work improvement is unlikely.-
One problem is that the commanding officer {or senior) is forced to 
play two concurrent roles when reviewing the report with a junior. 
He must be a judge (infonnation storage} which implies inflexibility and 
finality, and at the same time, be a counselor {work improvement) which 
implies understanding and flexibility./]_ Because the superior has al-
ready made a judgment, he defensively displays certainty and finality 
in the corrmunication process and his ability as a counselor suffers. 
He is anxious to avoid any personal implications in his 'objective 1 
assessment, othen-1ise he will have to defend his judgment while dealing 
face to face. 
A second problem is that the showing of the report necessarily im- · 
plies criticism of the ratee. It is a rare evaluation that does not 
criticize {we use the "absence of praise technique") . Self esteem is 
such that rarely will one hold a lower opinion of himself than others 
do. Most individuals will therefore react defensively to criticism. 
This process has been observed in experiments:/4 a marked relationship 
exists between the number of times a subordinate is criticized and the 
nunber of times he defends his perfonnance in an evaluation interview . 
A defensive ratee feels that he must excuse past perfonnance rather 
than concentrate on future improvement. The motivation for improvement 
is unlikely to come immediately after the subordinate has been deflated 
by criticism. The only motivation that might result is extrinsic, that 
/1 Huse, Edgar F., 11Perfonnance Appraisal-- A New Look, 11 Personnel 
Administration, Vol. 30, No. 2, Mar-April 1967, pp. 3-5, 16-19. 
/2 Zeitlein, Lawrence R., 11Planning for a Successful Perfonnance 
Review·? Personnel Journal, December 1969, p. 957. 
/3 Dayal, Ishwar, "Some Issues in Performance Appraisal, 0 Personnel 
Administration, Vol. 32, No. 1, Jan-Feb 1969, pp. 27-30. 
/4 Kay, E., J.R.P. French, Jr., and H.H. Meyer, "A Study of the 






is, the ratee desires to improve just to get a better evaluation from 
the rater. The better motivation is intrinsic, that is, a desire to 
perfonn well for the joy of the activity itself./.§_ 
Alternative to Present Policy 
To successfully accomplish the work improvement objective of per-
formance appraisal, I feel that evaluation must be divorced from coun-
selling work improvement. To do this: 
I. We should allow officers to see their fitness reports in a 
11showi ng" session. The purpose of the showing session should be to 
communicate the ratee 1 s evaluation to him. This communication is neces-
sary to the success of the separate job review session, if for no other 
reason than to indicate that the superior is open and not secretive. A 
certain amount of discussion on some particular points of the evaluation 
can be expected, but if the comments section is well written, the report 
will be self-explanatory in its justification of the evaluation. Coun-
selling on career planning, potential, etc., at this showing session 
should not be attempted. Because of the problems previously discussed, 
little motivation for behavior change can be expected to be developed 
immediately after a person has been criticized. 
II. We should motivate improved perfonnance by establishing job 
review sessions as distinct from evaluation show sessions. The purpose 
of the review session would be to counsel the junior on his future per-
fonnance. The frequency of the review sessions should be flexible. A 
study of reviews at General Electric has shown that perfonnance improves 
with increasing frequency of reviews, up to a maximum of about once 
monthly. /6 The rater should set a date for the next review at the con-
clusion of a review. The rater should be required to hold review sessions 
at least twice during one evaluation period. A statement that this has 
been done would be included in the comments ection (block 21) of the 
fitness reports. The review should not be held within one month of the 
show session to assist in the avoidance of the previously nentioned 
problems of mixing evaluation with motivation. 
What is Performance Review and How is it Conducted? 
The fundamental purpose of a job review is to improve perfonnance. 
"If this is to happen, the process needs to be related to work goals ••• 
The job review interview must be an opportunity for frank, personal 
discussion between people who share many common experiences and who 
are mutually interdependent. 11 fl 
/5 Maier, Nonnan R.F., "Three Types of Appraisal Interview, 11 
Personnel, Mar-Apr 1958, pp. 27-40. 
/6 French, John R.P., Jr . , Emanuel Kay, and H.H.Meyer, "Split Roles 
in Performance Appraisal," Harvard Business Review, Vol. 43, 1964, 
pp. 124-129. 
II Huse, Edgar F., "Perfonnance Appraisal--A New Look," Personnel 
Administration, Vol. 30, No. 2, Mar-April 1967, p. 16. 
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During the review, the junior must feel :/8 
I. An atmosphere of equality 
II. A sense of spontaneity 
III. That natural behavior exists 
IV. That there is evidence of empathy and respect 
V. That there is a provisional attitude 
VI. That there is a desire to define and solve problems. 
Obviously, the junior will feel none of the above if the senior 
dominates the interview and does most of the talking. Webster defines 
counselling as a mutual advising; a deliberation together. It is this O 
sense of mutuality that is necessary for motivation here. The motivation 
for the realization of self-fulfillment is one of the most powerful 
forces in an individual. A desire for self-fulfillment of goals can 
only result if the junior accepts the goals as his and not goals set 
unilaterally by the senior. 
A program for the interview itself might look like this: 
I. Review the current written statement of the subordinate's job 
description and then compare each participant's perception of the 
junior's actual job. This must be done first, or through the rest of 
the interview, the two participants could very easily be talking about 
two different jobs. If the written job description varies greatly, 
then take steps to have the official description changed. 
II. Review what the junior has done during the period since his 
last interview and discuss how this activity fitted in with his idea of 
what he can and cannot do well. -
III. Discuss what the subordinate would like to do in the coming 
period. Relate this to his estimates of his potential growth. 
IV. Discuss the reality of specific restraints upon individual 
freedom of action in areas where policy is truly inflexible. This, of 
course, implies a painful self-examination of the senior's part. 
Some questions the senior might ask in order to fulfill the above 
suggested four parts of the program are: 
· I. Here is your current job description. Does it resemble what 
you really do around here? 
II. What single activity gave you the most satisfaction during the 
past period? Why? 
III. What new tasks would you like to try in the near future? 
IV. How do you plan to accomplish these tasks? How can I help? 
V. How am I doing as your boss? (optional) What have I done 
recently that you feel helped you? Hindered you? What do you feel O 
the goals of this unit are? What do you feel they should be? In view 
of this, what do you think of the unit's future? 
When the two finish the interview, each should have a sheet of 
paper informally (but identically) detailing: 
I. Job description 
I I. Future goals 
III. Actions necessary to accomplish goals. 
/8 Butler, William N., "Supportive Communication and Performance 




The sheet would be a most valuable tool for each person to refer to in 
the coming period. It would become the basis for the subsequent job 
review. The sheets held by the senior would be returned to the junior 
upon either of the two people's detachment. 
Implementing the Program 
There are two actions that must be taken prior to having a success-
ful job review program. First, the raters must accept the program. 
Second, the raters must be trained to perfonn the actual reviewing 
sessions. 
I believe that raters can be convinced that the review idea is 
sound through an explanation of: 
I. Shortcomings in old (present) perfonnance appraisal policy. 
II. How job review is meant to overcome shortcomings. 
III. What it is and how it is done. 
This explanation could be contained in the official instruction certain 
to be drawn up to cover job review. BuPers Notice 1611 of 16 July 1970 
indicates that fonnal performance counselling has been accepted offici-
ally, at least. 
The training of raters is more difficult. We cannot hope (nor do 
we want!) to make clinical psychologists of them. Job review guidelines 
should be integrated into the current fitness report instruction . The 
instruction should contain extensive precepts for a successful review 
session. While guiding -- it should not offer 1 pat 1 solutions, as 
juniors will read the instruction too, and were these solutions available, 
they would take gleeful delight in eliciting "response 24c11 from a 
senior. 
On the two assumptions that: (1) 10% don't get the word, and (2) 
Practice makes perfect, a training school for raters should be developed. 
Knowing that the school would have to be cheap and quick, I envision a 
one-day session required of all prospective conmanding officers. The 
school would consist of two parts: 
I. Explanation of perfonnance appraisal 
A. Fitness report 
1. How to evaluate 
2. How reports are used in BuPers (this infonnation is 
sorely needed by prospective raters ... two birds .. } 
B. Job Review 
1. Why? 
2. How? 
II. Job review role playing sessions including group critique. 
Canel us ion 
The present perfonnance appraisal system is inadequate. Work im-
provement must be divorced from evaluation. The fitness report is satis-
factory for evaluation, but is a poor tool for a senior to use in 
motivating juniors. A separate job review program for work improvement 
is successful in industry and can well be used in the military. 
The review sessions will be initially difficult for the seniors con-
ducting them. It is a painful process for a leader (particularly a 
25 
----, 
military leader) to sit with a subordinate and be open with him. What 
do we lose by not doing it? "We lose a valuable tool for motivating 
him through his sense of personal achievement and self-esteem. Perhaps, 
most importantly, we lose a vital colllllunication link to the values and 
goals of our young subordinates. 11/9 We cannot afford to be without such 
a link. -
/9 Athas, Anthony G., 11 Is the Corporation Next to Fa 11?, 11 Harvard 
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lntroducti on 
A. •'The fitness reports of junior officers in the grades of warrant 
officer {W-1}, chief warrant officer (CW0-2}, and ensign through lieu-
tenant will be shown to those officers. This will be accompanied by 
personal counselling by the officer signing the report. The performance 
evaluation represented by the fitness report must be recognized by both 
the junior officer and the reporting senior as a very personal event, 
and the tenets of objectivity and credibility must be sustained. A 
frank and meaningful discussion and explanation of the report must be 
conducted with the purpose of the junior officer achieving fuller under-
standing of his perfonnance. This is an essential component of the system 
of management by objective and leadership emphasized in BuPers Instruction 
1611-12 series which establishes the guidelines for the preparation and 
submission of active duty officer fitness reports. Average as well as 
exceptional and below average performance must be addressed in a motivat-
ing and encouraging manner . The obj ective is to achieve and sustain the 
highest level of effort of which the officer is capable. The degree of 







personal leadership skill exercised by the reporting senior as well as on 
the personal desire of the junior" ./l 
B. The policy quoted above has-created new dimensions not only in 
the relationships between reporting seniors and junior officers, but also 
in the philosophy and rationale underlying the fitness report system 
itself. For over 20 years, the policy of the Navy Department had been 
to encourage reporting seniors to discuss - but not necessarily show -
fitness reports to the officer concerned. The present policy requires 
the reporting senior to show certain junior officers their fitness re-
ports, conduct a frank and meaningful discussion and explanation of the 
report, and counsel the officer on how to achieve and sustain the highest 
level of effort of which he is capable. I would guess that very few, if 
any, reporting seniors have a shipboard performance evaluation program 
that fully implements the revised policy regarding junior officer fitness 
reports. 
C. The purposes of this paper are: 
1. To discuss soTJE of the obvious and some of the not so obvious 
problems associated with a shipboard performance evaluation program. 
2. To offer a few ideas for consideration that m~ be of 
assistance to a reporting senior in resolving some of the problems. 
3. To recommend a scheme for implementing the new policy 
directive quoted above. 
D. In order to limit the scope of the discussion as well as take 
advantage of ll1Y prior background and experience, certain assumptions 
about the organizational setting of the reporting senior will be made 
as fo 11 ows :/ 2 
1. -That the reporting senior is a cormianding officer of a 
conventionally powered submarine. 
2. That the submarine is in the operating cycle between regular 
overhauls. 
3. That the nurrber, experience level and qualifications of 
officers assigned are within the normal range for a conventional submarine. 
General Discussion of the Problem 
A. Over the years, reporting seniors have carefully and conscientious-
ly prepared and discussed (in general terms) fitness reports with their 
officers. Ha.,.,ever, in the usual case, reporting seniors did not go into 
a detailed discussion of the rationale underlying each of the evaluations 
contained on the fitness report fonn. The current policy requires that 
the reporting senior do this in the case of certain junior officers. For 
example, the reporting senior must be prepared to discuss such questions 
as: 
1. What is the meaning and effect of the mark I received in 
Overall Performance of All Duties Assigned? 
/1 BuPers Notice 1611 of 16 July 1970. (Subj: Junior Officer 
Fitness Reporting), p. l. 
/2 These assumptions will not significantly degrade the basic ideas 
in this paper. 
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2. What are the specific reasons why you gave Joe a higher 
evaluation under Desirability than you gave me? 
3. Why did you not reco1TV11end me for accelerated promotion? 
4. What do I have to do in order to improve ll\Y mark in Overall 
Evaluation? 
5. What was the objective basis for each of the marks you gave 
me under Personal Characteristics? 
6. What do you mean by the statement under Comments to the 
effect that I do not have a pleasing personality? 
B. The above questions are typical of what a reporting senior should o 
expect during the counselling interview required by the new policy direc-
tive. Providing illuminating answers to these and similar type questions 
may be on~ of the most demanding tasks a reporting senior will ever face. 
The questions infer that the reporting senior must expand his thinking 
about performance evaluation procedures to include some of the techniques 
developed by behavioral scientists and industrial psychologists, including 
the use of scientific methods when practicable. The reporting senior can 
no longer base his performance evaluations on vague notions of individual 
and comnand goals, his imperfect memory, intuition, observations by others, 
and undocumented subjective measures of behavior. In order to comply with 
the letter and spirit of the new policy directive, the reporting senior 
must devise and implement a shipboard evaluation program that will pro-
vi de the framework for: 
1. Establishment of specific and obtainable objectives for each 
of his officers . 
2. A method of objectively or subjectively and/or quantitatively 
measuring the progress relative to a set of standards made by each officer 
towards accomplishment of his individual objectives. 
3. A feedback system that not only lets each officer know where 
he stands but will reinforce desirable behavior and encourage i!TPt)roved 
performance. 
C. Development of the evaluation program referred to above will 
require the reporting senior to have (or acquire) a basic understanding 
of such notions as fa 1 lows: 
1. Styles of Management. 
2. Uses of performance evaluation data . 
3. Establishment of perfonnance objectives . 
4. Setting of performance standards. 
5. Selection of perfonnance measures. 
6. A system of planned interviews. O 
D. The remainder of this paper will be devoted to a discussion of 
the above notions with emphasis on their applications within a submarine 
environment. 
Shipboard Perfonnance Evaluation Program 
A. Styles of Management. This is a subject within itself . Hundreds 
of books are available on the subject. For purposes of this paper, suffice 
it to say that management styles can be conceptualized as being located 
along a continuum with the 11democrati c style 11 at one pole and the "dicta-
torial style" at the other pole. The style practiced by most submarine 
coll1llanding officers, on balance, is more democratic than dictatorial. 




to practice management at a point on the continuum that provides him the 
desired results most consistently. This point will vary based on the 
internal and external circumstances that bear on the situation. The 
significant factor is that a commanding officer must be aware that in a 
submarine environment, his style of management is constantly visible to 
his subordinates and is likely to have a lasting effect on the behavioral 
patterns and perfonnance of his junior officers. 
B. Uses of Perfonnance Evaluation Data. The official objective of 
the fitness report system is to provide the "primary basis for selecting 
officers for promotion and assignment to duty11 ./3 This is undoubtedly 
true for the fitness report itself. However, I would like to make a 
distinction between the shipboard perfonnance evaluation program and the 
fitness report itself. I view the fitness report as the documentation 
associated with the perfonnance evaluation program that is prepared for 
external use. I consider that the objectives of the performance evalua-
tion program as related to junior officers should encompass the following 
areas in addition to the official objectives: 
1. Determination of the environmental adaptability of an officer 
for s ubma ri ne duty. 
2. Detennination of an officer's aptitude for submarine duty 
in particular and the Navy in general. 
3. Provision of opportunities for professional growth and 
development in academic and practical subject areas. 
Admittedly, the above objectives cannot be entirely separated from 
the official objectives. The idea is that the shipboard perfonnance 
evaluation program should ful fi 11 both the external and shipboard needs. 
C. Establishment of Performance Ob~ectives. This is where the 
problem starts to get tough. The comman ing officer must establish, as 
a matter of policy, what he expects each officer to accomplish within 
a given time frame. The concept is termed 11management by objectives 11 
and is emphasized in the instruction governing the preparation of fitness 
reports as follows: 
11 In order to foster a concept of management by objectives, reporting 
seniors should seek to establish with each and every subordinate mutually 
understood, finite objectives for which the subordinate will be held 
accountab 1 e. 11 / 4 
The degree of objective definition required is relatable to the 
experience level/seniority of the officer concerned. That is, objectives 
for the junior officer should be spelled out in greater detail than the 
objectives for the more experienced officer. The objectives established 
must be mutually understood by the officer and the colllTlanding officer. 
Additionally, the objectives should be documented in writing. The docu-
ment should also specify the procedure for measurement of the degree of 
accomplishment of each objective as well as the target date for partial 
or complete accomplishment. For example, some of the objectives estab-
lished for a junior officer could be as follows: 
/3 BuPers Instruction 1611.128 of 29 April 1970, (Subj: Report on 
the Fitness of Officers). p. 3. 
/4 Ibid, p. 10. 
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Objective/~ 
Qualify as an in-
port duty officer 
Complete investiga-
tion of car accident 
Qualify as 00D under-
way - surfaced 
Qualify as 00D under-
way - submerged 
Complete chapters l 
thru 5 of Qualifica-
tion in S/M notebook 
Measurement Procedure 
Verbal and practical examination 
given by Senior Watch Officer 
Review by XO; Signature by CO 
Verbal and written examination by 
XO. Practical examination by CO. 
Verbal and written examination by 
XO. Practical examination by CO. 
Turn in at least one chapter per 
month to XO for review. 










D. Setting of Performance Standards. The official performance 
standard is the subjective comparison of an officer's perfonnance with 
the performance of all other officers known by the reporting senior that 
are in the same grade, same competitive category and approximately the 
same time in grade as the officer being reported on. This means that 
an officer is competing with an image formed over the years and held in 
the "minds eye" of the reporting senior of what an officer's level of 
performance should be. In reality, the reporting senior may be comparing 
an officer's performance against what he perceived his performance to be 
when he was in the same grade X years ago. In any event, the performance 
standard means different things to different people. A more definitive 
official standard is prescribed when considering the overall or summary 
evaluation of an officer's performance. This is the requirement to 
record the nurrber of officers of the same grade that were rated in each 
of the summary categories. (It would seem that this information would 
be more meaningful if the officer being reported on was rank ordered in 
relation to the ether officers in the same category.) The application 
of performance standards to the accomplishment of performance objectives 
is an important part of the shipboard performance evaluation program. 
The submarine corrunanding officer is fortunate in some respects in that 
the standards associated with many of the more common objectives (i.e., 
Qualification-in-Submarines and 00D Qualifications) are well defined in 
official publications. However, the submarine commanding officer is still 
faced with the problem of setting realistic standards for the less common 
objectives. In recognition of reality, these standards are usually more 
subjective than objective . 
E. Selection of Performance Measures. Following the establishment 
of performance objectives and the setting of performance standards, the 
commanding officer must select a measure (or set of measures) designed 
to gauge the degree of accomplishment of the objective compared with 
/'.i In most cases, additional guidance could be provided in the fonn 






the standard. Some of the more common performance measures were intro-
duced while discussing Establishment of Performance Objectives. Specific-
ally. I am referring to completion or partial completion of an objective to 
the satisfaction of some reviewing or examining officer. This type of mea-
sure can be subjective or objective depending on the nature. of the task 
being measured. The commanding officer should use objective and/or quan-
titative measures insofar as possible and practicable. This is a difficult 
problem in some cases because the measure of performance aboard a submarine 
(or any other ship) usually involves the opinions of individuals. Some 
objective and/or quantitative measures which could be equated to the 
accomplishment of an objective assigned to an individual officer are as 
foll~s: 
1. Percentage of personnel who passed the last advancement-in-
rate examinations. 
2. Number of officers who have been attached to the submarine 
for more than one year and are not designated Qualified-in-Submarines. 
3. Number of exercise torpedoes that were lost during a specific 
ti me period. • 
4. Average duration (in seconds) of periscope observations 
recorded during an Approach and Attack exercise. 
5. Average time required to recover the 11dul'llllY11 during a series 
of man overboard drills. 
6. Average nunber of days leave taken by each officer during 
a specified time period. 
7. Grades assigned on the various inspections conducted by 
external conmands. 
The most important point to remerrber when selecting performance 
evaluation measures is the concept of validity. That is, the measures 
selected must directly relate to what you are trying to measure. For 
example, if the commanding officer wanted ta measure the performance of 
an 000 underway - surfaced, he might want to evaluate the officer in 
areas such as the following: 
1. Knowledge of nautical Rules-of-the-Road. 
watch. 
2. Knowledge of the tactical characteristics of the submarine. 
3. Preparations and inspections made prior to relieving the 
4. Ability to fix the sh1p1 s position accurately using the 
various sensor equipments. 
5. Kn<Mledge of commanding officers' standing orders. 
The idea is to measure those attributes which the commanding officer 
believes to be the most valid predictors of satisfacto .ry perfonnance by 
an 000./6 
The-recording of critical incidents/I is another useful subjective 
tool in measuring performance. In a submarine environment, the commanding 
officer and executive officer have plenty of opportunities to personally 
/6 This pre-supposes that the conmanding officer has fonnulated a 
mental-and/or physical model of a satisfactory 00D. 
/7 Examples of especially good or especially bad performance. 
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observe the perfonnance of subordinate officers. So there is no reason 
why a considerable number of critical incidents could not be collected on 
each officer. The commanding officer should establish his policy as to 
what he considers a critical incident to be. for example, most commanding 
officers would consider the following examples of perfonnance as critical 
incidents: 
1. Failure of an 000 to carry out the commanding officer's stand-
ing or night orders. 
2. Grade received by each department on an Administrative 
Inspection. O 
3. Unauthorized absence or missing the movement of the submarine. 
4. At sea repair of a material casualty that would have nonnally • 
required tender or base assistance. 
A System of Planned Interviews 
A. The shipboard perfonnan ce evaluation program shaul d be genera 1 ly 
functional following establishment of perfonnance objectives, setting of 
perfonnance standards, and selection of performance measures. The re-
maining problem is to devise a scheme ta implement the new policy directive 
discussed in the Introduction to this paper. In review, the new policy 
requires the reporting senior to: 
1. Show the fitness report to certain specified junior officers. 
2. Conduct a frank and meaningful discussion and explanation of 
the fitness report with each of the junior officers. 
3. Personally counsel each junior officer with th~ objective of 
achieving and sustaining the highest level of effort within the capability 
of that officer. 
B. I propose that a system of "planned interviews" will not only 
provide a workable solution to the problem of implementing the new policy 
directive but will also provide support far the shipboard perfonnance 
evaluation program as well. My definition of a planned interview is 
simply an interview that is planned and scheduled in advance. By a system 
of planned interviews, I am referring to a series of interviews conducted 
by pre-designated officers within known or predictable time intervals . 
For convenience, I will label and define the individual planned inter-
views within the system as follows: 
l. Initial. This interview is ·conducted in two phases. Phase 
I of the initial interview is conducted by the executive officer with each 
and every officer shortly after he reports aboard the submarine. The 
purposes of Phase I are as follows: 
a. Explain the shipboard performance evaluation program 
(including perfonnance objectives, standards and measures) and system of 
planned interviews. 
b. Establish in writing mutually understood, finite objec-
tives for which the officer will be held accountable. 
Phase II of the initial interview is conducted by the com-
manding officer with each junior officer specified in the new policy 
directive about 7-days after completion of the Phase I interview./1! 
The purpose of Phase II is to confirm the officers understanding of 






his individual role in the shipboard perfonnance evaluation program and 
system of planned interviews. 
2. Pro ress Coachin. This interview is conducted by the coRJDahd-
ing officer wit eac o 1cer about halfWay in the interval between the 
time of the initial interview or appraisal interview and the due date of 
the officer 1s fitness report.n_ The purpose of this interview is to re-
view the progress made by the officer towards accomplishment of his 
assigned objectives, modify objectives, resolve any problems, and to 
coach and encourage the officer as necessary. The conrnanding officer 
should record his observations following the interview. 
3. Appraisal. This interview is conducted by the co111T1anding officer 
with each officer at the end of his fitness report period. The purpose 
of this interview is to show each junior officer his fitness report as 
required by the new policy directive./10 Additionally, the corrananding 
officer will utilize this opportunity to conduct a frank and meaningful 
discussion and explanation of the fitness report followed by appropriate 
counselling of each junior officer. The commanding officer must also be 
prepared to discuss the basis for his evaluations as recorded on the 
fitness report. The documentation provided by the shipboard perfonnance 
eva 1 uation program (performance objectives, perfonnance standards, per-
formance measures, interview records, critical incidents record) should 
provide the commanding officer with sufficient data to effectively handle 
most questions. 
Canel usi on 
A. I believe that the shipboard performance evaluation program and 
system of planned interviews proposed in this paper would result in in-
creased benefits for the Navy, for the submarine service and for the 
individual officer. 
1 . The Navy should benefit by having fitness reports that are 
more valid and reliable for use in selecting officers for promotion and 
assignment to duty. 
2. The submarine service should benefit from getting improved 
perfonnance from a better trained and higher rooti vated officer. 
3. The individual officer should benefit from an increase in 
job satisfaction as a result of: 
a. Improved junior/senior co111T1uni cations and resultant 
high degree of mutual understanding. 
b. Guidance and counsel provided by the commanding officer. 
c. Increased motivation. 
d. Improved job perfonnance. 
e. Assurance that his fitness reports accurately reflect 
his perfonnance of duty. 
/2. This interview, as part of the planned interview system, is 
conducted by the co1T1T1anding officer. However, I do not mean to imply 
that the executive officer is being bypassed. The executive officer, in 
his role as training officer, is obligated to monitor the progress of 
each officer. 
/10 The commanding officer may or may not show the fitness report 
to his other officers. 
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B. One of the major shortcomings of my plan is its lack of an ob-
jective basis for quantification of the marks assigned in the Personal 
Characteristics section of the fitness report. It would appear that 
stbjective documentation of observable behavior {critical incidents) is 
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Introduction 
Officers and enlisted personnel within the military services must 
have something else than just a good salary, a long list of benefits and 
a history of tradition to induce them t o "ship over" - to pick the mili-
tary as a way of life. 
What are the intrinsic or extri nsic factors, the service characteris-
tics or the involvement motivators that will help the Services keep their 
highly trained and highly skilled personnel? The intent of this paper 
is to shew that there is no one answer because man is a complex indiv i dual 
of many needs and potentials; and that his complexity is likely to differ 
greatly among individuals. The psychological contract between complex 
man and his military organization is a major factor which affects his 
behavior and will greatly influence his decision on a military career . 
Military managers since the start of World War II have pondered, 
"What makes contemporary military man function? 11 Years ago, and to a 






man under an authoritarian based management method. The military service 
is still discussed in today's business schools as one of two basic 
authoritarian management models./! 
Background 
11Military and civilian managers find basic authoritarianism no 
longer acceptable in its traditional sense. Factors which brought about 
the creation of authoritarianism centuries ago no longer exist. Most 
people who carried the weapons of war had little fonnal education. Most 
could neither read nor write. They relied on individuals with some 
education to tell them what to do. For the purpose of a unified and 
comnon force, blind obedience to a central knowledgeable authority was 
required. Control of this force was maintained through fear of punish-
ment. 
Today's military force in the United States has evolved from an 
early-day uneducated, must-be-led mass of individuals to current-day 
technol ogi cal ly and i nfonnati on-oriented population. 11 /f 
Generally, the more education an individual acquires, the more he 
tends to think and act independently. 
"Approximately 60 percent of the 1968 high school graduating class 
in the United States entered college that fall. The forecast is that 
one-half will graduate with a baccalaureate degree in four years. Within 
the next 14 years, two-thirds of our population living in metropolitan 
areas will have attended college."/3 
In 1970, 78.8 percent of the officers in the military service were 
college graduates, the highest ever. Five and eight tenths (5.8) percent 
of the enlisted men were ,college graduates and 85.2 percent of enlisted 
men graduated from high school. 
What does the increase in educational level of the populace have to 
do with retention rates of military personnel? An indication is that the 
more people are educated to a level of experience where they are capable 
and desire to think for themselves, the more they resent authoritarianism 
as a form of management. 
Psychological contract 
"One of the main hypotheses in personality theory is that people 
are open systems and consequently seek a degree of mastery or control 
over their external environment. 11 /! 
/l Koontz, Harold and Cyril O'Donnel, Princi~les of Management, N.Y.: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 4th Edition, 1968, pp. 1 -20. 
/2 Drumn, Robert H., LTCOL, USAF, 11Anned Forces Managers in a New 
Era, 11 Military Review, Vol. XLIX, November 1969, p. 23. 
/3 Bennis, Warren S., 11The Coming Death of Bureaucracy," Management 
Review:-Vol. 56, No. 3, March 1969, p. 23. 
/4 Trahair, Richard C.S., "Dynamics of a Role Theory for the Worker's 
Judgment," Human Relations, Vol. 22, No. 2, April 1969. 
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If a degree of control is usually sought by most people then we ex-
pect to find that it is important in the work situation. Individuals have 
certain expectations about organizations they work for and it is the same 
in the mlitary organization. Servicemen make assumptions about the nature 
of their organizations and expect the Service to behave in certain ways 
toward them. The actual interaction between the serviceman and the mili-
tary service can best be thought of as the working out of a psychological 
contract through a process of reciprocation. The Service does certain 
things to and for the serviceman and refrains from doing other things. 
In exchange, the serviceman reciprocates by working hard, doing a good 0 
job and following orders. The notion of a psychological contract implies 
that the individual has a variety of expectations of the organization and 
that the organization has a variety of expectations of him. These expec-
tations not only cover how much work is to be done for how much pay, but 
also involve the whole pittem of rights, privileges, and obligations 
between both parties of the contract. For example, the serviceman may 
expect the service to train him in a specialized field and to be stationed 
at an exotic duty station sometime during his tour of duty. The Service 
expects that the serviceman will serve in an honorable manner and not run 
dCMn the public 1 s image of that service. Expectations such as these are 
not written into any fonnal agreement between the Service and the individ-
ual. yet they operate powerfully as determinates of behavior. The organi-
zation enforces its expectations through the use of whatever power and 
authority it has. The individual enforces his expectations through 
attempts to influence the organization or by withholding his participation 
and involvement. Both parties to the contract are guided by assumptions 
concerning what is fair and equitable. The assumptions of the military 
hierarchy about the individual serviceman are gradually changing as con-
temporary realities are brought to light by studies and research. The 
presently accepted theories of motivation recognize that individuals 
-work to fulfill a variety of needs, not one kind; and as man matures, 
encounters experiences and various environmental sti muli, his needs, 
perception and attitudes change. These needs, as described by Dr. 
Abraham Maslow and others/5 are : 
I. Physiological -
(thirst, hunger, and sex) 
II. Safety 
(security and health) 
III. Social 
(identity and affection) O 
IV. Egoistic 
(prestige, esteem and self respect) 
V. Self-fulfillment 
(desire for personal growth) I 
Figure 1 
/5 Haynes, W. Warren and Joseph L. Massie, Management Analysis, 
Concepts and Cases, 2nd Edition, Prentice-Hall, 1969 andEdwardJ. Murray, 




Traditionally, these needs are presented in a hierarchy. Figure l depicts 
this hierarchy and indicates the relative importance of these needs./§_ 
Under this concept, physiological needs are basic, and self-fulfillment 
needs, which are never completely satisfied, are the highest and not 
necessarily important until the lower needs are satisfied. According to 
Douglas M. McGregor, man is a wanting animal. As soon as one of his 
needs is satisfied, another takes its place in an unending process from 
birth to death. A satisfied need is not a motivator of behavior./I 
Traditional Need Fulfillment 
Even with the realization that man is a complex individual with many 
motives and needs arranged in some sort of hierarchy, the past and present 
emphasis of the military hierarchy in fulfilling human needs is still 
concentrated primarily on remuneration. 
"One provision, high on Defense's list for subrpission to the new 
congress, would provide big cash incentives (perhaps as much as $15,000) 
to officers who elect to stay past their obligated service for five years. 11/8 
11The business world has found that 'Finns whose reward is confined to 
remuneration find that more dollars sometimes fail to satisfy social and 
ego needs. ' 11 /'l. 
When lower needs are more satisfied, higher needs develop, and 
patterns of psychosocial needs would change from the fonnat shown in 
Figure l to one that emphasizes higher 
needs. As this change continues to 
progress, the needs structure may fonn 
patterns of diminishing lower needs V 
and expandihg higher needs (Figure 
2). Under this hypothesis, man would 
devote more and more energy to ego 
satisfaction and self-fulfillment 
which are 11intrinsic needs. 11 
Figure 2 
/§_ Maslow, Abraham H., Motivation and Personality, N.Y.: Harper & 
Row, 1954, pp. 80-106. 
II McGregor, Douglas M., The Human Side of Enterprise, N.Y.: 
McGraw-Hi 11 Book Company, Inc. , l 960, p. 36. 
/8 Schweitz, Bob, 110fficer Career Setup Revamp Due," Navy Times, 
Vol. 20, No. 15W, January 20, 1971, p. 1. 
/']_ Ibid., Koontz and O'Donnel, p. 580. 
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Intrinsic Factors 
"Certain Social Scientists (Argyris, 1957; Herzberg, 1959; Maslow, 
1954; McGregor, 1960) emphasize the importance of the intrinsic factors 
in contributing to worker satisfaction. Their basic contention is that 
the healthy individual desires to mature and to develop and use his 
native abilities to the fullest extent. According to this view, all 
individuals are motivated towards personal growth, the fulfillment of 
which leads to the highest level of satisfaction. Some individuals, 
however, because of situational variables, insecurity or other personal-
ity factors, would not be able to achieve self-actualization. 11/J.Q. 
Many studies directed in the area of Job Satisfaction/11, Occupational 
Goals/lf., and Need Grati fi cation/]1 have found and support the following 
statements concernin g the value of "intrinsic elements 11 of a job: 
111. Intrinsic elements contribute significantly more to overall 
job satisfaction than did extrinsic items (Halpern (1966)). 
2. Intrinsic items are more potent both as satisfiers and dissatis-
fiers (Wernimont (1966)). 
3. Intrinsic elements account for more variance in overall job 
satisfaction than did extrinsic elements and the intrinsic elements corre-
lated with job involvement (Weissenberg and Gruenfeld {1968)). 
4. Saleh (1964) found that pre-retirees, when looking backward 
over their careers, rel ated intrinsic items to satisfaction and extrinsic 
elements to dissatisfaction. 11/Ji 
Satisfactions are not derived from intrinsic or extrinsic elements alone 
but rather from a combination of activities which are membership bound, 
intrinsically motivating, and ego involving. 
11The involvement of an individual in the Service is related to his 
perception of the Military Organization as an exclusive providerof 
important satisfactions. 11/15 
For the organization to dominate involvement it must actually provide 
satisfactions, and it must be seen as providing satisfaction opportunities 
which relate to the individual ' s perception and expectation. 
/10 Saleh, S. D. and John Hyde, "Intrinsic vs Extrinsic Orientation 
and JobSatisfaction, " Occupational Psychology, Vol. 43, No. 1, 1969, p. 47. 
/.11 lbi d., pp. 47-53. 
/12 Goo<Min, Leonard. "Occupational Goals and Sat is factions of 
the American Work Force, " Personnel Psychology, Vol. 22, No. 3, Autumn 
1969, pp. 313-325. 
/13 Wolf, Martin G. "Need Gratification Theory," Journal of Applied 
Psychology, Vol. 54, No. l, 1970, pp. 87-94. 
/ll, Ibid . , pp. 87-89. 
/15 Weissenberg, Peter and Leopold W. Gruenfeld, "Relationship 
BetweenJob Satisfaction and Job Involvement, 11 Journal of Applied Psy-







From the side of the serviceman, the psychological contract is im-
plemented through his perception that he can influence the organization 
or his own immediate situation sufficiently to insure that he will not 
be taken advantage of. His sense of influencing the situation is partly 
the result of his accegtance of the system by which people have come to 
be in positions of aut ority and partly on his belief that he is able 
to change his situation in the organization. The method of how he can 
change his situation is not so important as his fundamental belief that 
he has some power to influence if from his point of view the psychologi-
cal contract is not being met. 
The military services may pay lip service to an individual's needs 
and motives, but the emphasis first and foremost is on the fulfillment 
of the organization's needs. As the field of recruitment has developed 
and become refined, these assumptions that an individual is to be 
measured, classified and fitted into a slot have remained essentially 
unchanged. A Service builds up an image of itself through the manner 
in which it recruits, selects and trains its memers. If the serviceman 
who joined because of promises, effective recruitment or by draft comes 
to view himself as part of a mechanical, impersonal system which cares 
little for his needs and dignity, he will feel that his psychological 
contract has been broken and it may well undenriine his long run contri-
bution in creativity and work effectiveness. Instead, he may become 
the good but apathetic worker, carefully keeping his real self-involve-
ment out of the picture. An organization cannot function unless the 
members of the organization consent to the operating authority system, 
and this consent by the members hinges upon the upholding of the psycho-
logical contract between member and organization. 
Complex Man 
Thus far, we have said that as an individual acquires more education, 
the more he tends tothink and act independently; also that people are 
open systems and consequently seek a degree of control over their external 
environment and that people have various needs arranged in some sort of 
hierarchy. Since people differ in education, experiences, maturity, 
wants, needs ..... therein lies the difficulty of generalizing about man. 
Man is complex with his many needs and potentials and is also likely to 
differ from his neighbor in the patterns of his own complexity. The 
following are assumptions which can be stated about coJll)lex man: 
"a. Man is not only complex, but also highly variable; he has many 
motives which are arranged in sane sort of hierarchy of importance to 
him, but this hierarchy is subject to change from time to time and 
situation; furthermore, motives interact and comine into complex motive 
patterns (for example, since money can facilitate self-actualization, 
for sane people economic strivings are equivalent to self-actualization). 
b. Man is capable of learning new motives through his organizational 
experiences, hence ultimately his pattern of motivation and the psycholog-
ical contract which he establishes with the organization is the result 
of a complex interaction between initial needs and organizational 
expe ri en ces. 
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c. Man can respond to many different kinds of managerial strategies, 
depending on his own motives and abilities and the nature of the task; 
in other words, there is no one correct managerial strategy that will 
work for all men at al 1 times. 11/1§_ 
As the theories about man have evolved from those of Rational-Economic 
man, Social man, and Self-Actualizing man to the present theory of 
Complex man, the strategy of management owards man has also evolved. 
"In both classical and social-man theories, the psychological con-
tract involves the exchange of extrinsic rewards (economic ones or 
social ones) for perfonnance. In the self-actualizing-man theory, the 
contract involves the exchange of opportunities to obtain intrinsic 
rewards (satisfaction from accomplishment and the use of one1s capaci-
ties) for high-quality performance and creativity. 11/]2 
Realizing that there is no one correct strategy that will work for all 
men, organizations must be flexible, be prepared to accept a variety 
of interpersonal relationships, recognize and identify different needs 
and understand changing psychological contracts. 
Surrmary 
The military organization and the actions which it takes detennine 
the intrinsic and extrinsic job attributes. The officers and enlisted 
experiences of these attributes determine their satisfaction and/or 
dissatisfaction, affect their behavior and influence their decision of 
whether to make the military service a career. If the services are going 
to retain their highly trained and skilled personnel, they must, in 
addition to emphasizing remuneration, make necessary changes in policies, 
actions and attitudes where possible to acconmodate the desire of the 
individual to satisfy his changing and evolving needs. They must also 
leam to value difference and to establish relationships with complex 
man which will influence the manner in which he carries out his jobs 
or fulfills his roles. 
/1§_ Schein, Edgar H. , Organizational Psychology, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965, p. 60. 
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Having examined the nature of complex man's motivations, the psycho-
logical contract and the implications of this contract for the young man 
joining the Anned Forces, further examination of motivational factors is 
necessary. This necessity arises from the requirement to solicit the 
voluntary services of large nurrbers of men each year to serve in the mili-
tary. Among competing military services, each must evolve its <Mn public 
relations programs as effective vehicles for recruitment. In order to 
identify an effective recruiting program, one must consider a number of 
varying motivational and sociological influences . 
In the Marine Corps, as in any organization, demands exist for input 
of properly motivated and qualified personnel. These demands are growing 
increasingly important as we near the era of 1973 and the termination of 
the Selective Service program. There is sufficient data to suggest that 
some drastic revisions in the recruitment programs will be required if the 
services are to maintain necessary force levels in the no-draft United 
States social system. The lack of the draft as a means of pressuring 
volunteers has already prompted concern in many military circles, particu-
larly in light of 1he growing wave of anti-militarism among today's youth. 
Recent surveys conducted by the Aney indicate that of their volunteer popu-
lation, only 20% _are what could truly be described as volunteers, the 
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remainder being draft motivated and enlisting primarily to avoid service 
in the conbat arms such as infantry, artillery, etc . /1 Similar studies 
also support the contention that the Reserve and National Guard are sus-
pect havens for draft evaders with a 1970 survey revealing draft motivated 
enlistments at 83% in the Anny, 86.5% in the Air Force, 75% in the Navy and 
50% in the Marine Corps./2 
Prior to evolving a recruiting approach for any organizational entity, 
one must examine the basic elements of public opinion, their trends and 
most importantly, the target population that the organization intends to 
reach, or wishes to recruit. 
The agents of social change deserve their own attention, and to be-
come excessively involved in their validity and origins would be cumbersone 
and unnecessary. From a recruiting standpoint, one need not be so concerned 
with why a trend exists or with its validity in ref l ecting the truth, but 
one needs to be more concerned with the fact that it exists, and what 
implications it poses to recruiting efforts. --
It appears to be a safe generalization that a la rge segment of con-
temporary .American society is disillusioned and confused by the IT\Yriad of 
problems it encounters daily. Noticeably foremost in this disillusionment 
is the dissatisfaction prompted by the presence of mushrooming technological 
capacity, the multitude of brilliant minds and the corresponding lack of 
effective and timely action to cure social and other ills. Max Ways writes 
of this crisis in the April 1971 edition of Fortune magazine and describes 
it as the "knowledge-action IT\YStery"./3 He contends that today's American 
is truly concerned by the continuing presence of so many social problems 
accompanied by continuing technological refinement and the emergence of 
so much individual talent. As might be expected, American youth reflects 
the same disillusionment as do their parents, but with an increased emo-
tional dimension. Some observers feel that the decline of radical activism 
on college campuses this year specifically reflects youth's growing sense 
of futility, an evolving conviction that no matter what action they attempt, 
their contributions will become lost in "the system"./4 
. The presence of such disillusionment in youth brings serious problems 
to not only the Government, but business as well . The great homogeneity 
of attitude during the Fifties and early Sixties, our formative years, 
which defied the "organization man" and efl1)hasized individual identification 
with corporate goals,/5 has evolved into an attitude that villifies 
/! Monterey Peninsula Herald, 3 February 1971. 
/2 "If U.S. Tries an All Volunteer Anny -- A Survey of Military 
Experts, 11 U.S. News and World Report, 1 March 1971. 
/3 ·Max Ways,11Don1t We Know Enough to Make Better Public Policies?", 
Fortune, Apri 1 1971. 
/4 11What the People Think of Today's America,11 U.S. News and World 
Report, 29 March 1971. 
/5 William H. Whyte, Jr . , The Organization Man (Garden City, N.Y.: 






"organization" as dehumanizing, indifferent and something to be avoided in 
order to pursue meaningful purpose in life! The existence and the growth 
of this distaste supports a contention that society is rapidly becoming 
oriented toward and concerned with satisfying more intrinsic needs. Thus 
the social structure as a whole begins to reflect the Maslow need hierarchy 
at its higher levels. What is crucial to "organization", however, is that 
this strong trend caricatures organization as the antithesis to self-ful-
fi l lment. 
General Electric Corporation made a recent effort to boost its sagging 
image with youth by surveying and identifying ten major areas of youthful 
dissatisfaction aimed at itself. In attempting to direct conrnunication 
efforts to dispelling untruths in these areas, much to their chagrin, they 
found that their credibility was laughed off by their target population./§_ 
Other businesses and businessmen are feeling the pinch in the job market 
for young people./l Even academic institutions are seeing this attitudinal 
derivative, with both Harvard and Yale reporting increased numbers of seniors 
expressing serious doubts as to their career plans, with Yale noting a de-
cline of 50% in the last two years of those choosing business careers upon 
graduation./8 Conclusions from these facts should be obvious: we in the 
Military, as-identified members of 11organization 11 or, if you prefer, "the 
establishment", are faced with a declining market for young people, in-
creased competition within that market and removal of the single, most 
powerful equalizer that helped us to hold our own in the past, the draft. 
The shift in socio-economic values toward the intrinsic range of the 
need spectrum is further underscored by the recent Life magazine youth 
attitude poll, in which young people reported the following four factors 
to be of the most importance in their selection of a job or career: 
1. Enjoyable work 
2. P ri de i n the job 
3. Pleasant working conditions 
4. Creative satisfaction 
and the least important: 
l. Short hours 
2. Recognition by society 
3. Achieving status 
In this same survey, we find reinforcement of the contention that young 
people do not equate job satisfaction or fulfillment with large organiza-
tion, when we examine responses to the following question: 
Would you rather work for: 
A big company 










/6 Carl W. Ritter, 11How a Major Corporation Scores Points with Youth," 
San Jose Mercury, 25 April 1971. 
/7 Daniel Parker, 11The Generation Gap -- Where the Action Is, 11 
Advanced Management Journal, Vol. 32, No. 3, July 1967, pp. 9-14. 
/§. Pamela Swift, 11What Now, June Grad?", Parade, 25 April 1971. 
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There might also be another indicator here in that in the same survey only 
9% indicated that they were intending to join the Anned Forces after com-
pleting school./i 
Still prior to formulation of any public relations policies, the 
concerned organization will examine personnel characteristics and capa-
bilities considered necessary for effective performance, and having made 
such an analysis, thus identifies its target population. Many such studies 
have been conducted in the Anned forces, really a military application of 
the consumer survey though much more complex. From this point, however, 
it is appropriate to restrict the scope of further presentation to the 
factors identified with the Marine Corps. 
Jack L. Mahan, Jr. and George A. Clum have recently published some 
interesting findings based upon longitudinal studies conducted over a 
four year period with a group of enlisted Marines and have identified both 
demographic and attitudinal indicators of corrbat effectiveness./10 Exami-
nation of these indicators will help to establish a target population for 
Marine Corps recruiting efforts. The entire recruiting goal is to recruit 
effective Marines, not a group of immature, disordered or ineffective young 
men who will not stand the rigors of training and conbat. Concurrently, 
it is equally unrealistic to exclusively structure a recruiting approach 
toward a general stereotype constructed from the various characteristics 
associated with conbat effectiveness. Such stereotyping is misleading, 
since the probability is extremely low that any single individual possesses 
all the characteristics of the stereotype. A loose stereotype will, how-
ever, serve a useful purpose in indicating a starting point for a recruit-
ing approach. Such a stereotype is a composite of individual characteristics 
identified in Marines rated combat effective by their immediate superiors; 
all possessing at least one of the characteristics, some possessing more 
than one, but few possessing all. 
Oemographi c Attitudinal 
1. Older and better educated l. Moderate, did not completely 
2. Fewer academic failures, agree or disagree with state-
arrests, expulsions ments about Marine Corps. 
3. More siblings 2. Realistic expectations about 
4. Greater academic and recruit training 
social success in school 3. Some little uncertainty about 
5. Participation in clubs & Marine Corps being interested 
sports (as team captain) in needs 
6. Bom other than Pacific 4. Desired to participate in Marine 
Coast, New England or Corps endorsed activity 
Mountain states 5. Valued combativeness, preferred 
7. Not influenced by occupa- special forces arms (Recon) 
tional specialty in effect- 6. Wanted more recognition of 
iveness individual achievement 
7. Wanted to be recognized for efforts. 
/9 "Change Yes -- Upheaval No,11 life, Vol. 70, No. l, 8 January 
1971, pp. 22-30. 
/10 Jack L. Mahan, Jr. and George A. Clum, 11Longitudinal Prediction 
of Marine Combat Effectiveness .. and "Attitudes Predictive of Marine Combat 








These results were the final products of the studies, but since much of 
the theme of this presentation is related to opinion and attitudes, 
there are some intermediate attitudes that are meaningful in addition to 
the final composite. They are: 
1. Would not have volunteered without draft 
2. Did not consider Marine Corps too soft 
3. Believed the Marine Corps interested in teaching required skills, 
but did not feel that men were adequately trained for many rou-
tinely encountered jobs. 
4. Marine Corps did not give sufficient explanation for things it 
required men to do. 
5. Harsh discipline not a requisite for good combat performance./]l 
These factors then become the basis for identifying the target popu-
lation that Marine Corps is to attempt to recruit. And since the stereo-
type may be allowed to detennine a starting point, examination of the 
indicators involved may be of further value. A little imagination suggests 
that the characteristics identified, both demographic and attitudinal, 
bear strong resemblance to McClelland1s "self-motivated achiever."/12 
Dr. David C. McClelland formulated what he described as a 11self-
motivated achiever, 11 a high need achiever, often found in an entrepre-
neurial context, but not categorically excluded from non-entrepreneurial 
activity. Among the most salient characteristics of the self-motivated 
achiever is his ~lectivity, his desire to personally select and set the 
levels of his goals. These goals are realistic and moderate, never im-
possible, but usually are at the limits of his ability so that he con-
tinually exerts himself. Characteristically, these selected goals involve 
some degree of risk, some necessity to take chances, thus his compatibility 
with entrepreneurial activity. He is a constantly striving man, often but 
not necessarily working by himself, and he requires little supervision 
as his high standards of performance are self-perpetuating. He functi ans 
best under broad controls , works at his own rapid pace and does not 
appreciate rigid direction. If his personal goals are well integrated 
with the organization. he prefers to make his own interpretations of how 
to best contribute toward these organizational goals . Often this occurs 
with greater perception and ingenuity than in higher levels of management, 
since he is an expert at his own tasks. He does, however, require frequent 
and rapid feedback as to the merits of his performance. In a cyclic manner, 
he uses this approbation to maintain his own high self-esteem propelling 
himself to further self-extension. This necessity for feedback is what 
often leads him into entrepreneurial activity or corporate sales, since 
feedback there is clear cut and immediate. 
Obviously no person possesses only the above characteristics and 
this stereotype fails to identify variations. However, the general 
stereotype does exist in society. One might well question any further 
conclusions drawn from this similarity by suggesting that this self-
Ill Ibid., pp. 59-62. 
11Achievement Motivation Can Be Developed,11 
Anal sis Conce ts and Cases, Eds. W.W.Hczynes and J.L. Massie 
1f s, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969). 
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motivated achiever is successful in many walks of life. A further and 
logical reservation at this point would also challenge the size of the 
11co11Dat effective 11 sample. In answer to both queries, the incidence of 
the self-motivated achiever 's success in many vocations is no basis for 
restricting a recruiting appeal, and it should also be stated that 34% of 
the sample population in the effectiveness survey were classified as 
"above average combat effectiveness 11 • This in itself is unusual, for if 
our stereotype is accurate, and if McClelland1s estimate that only 10% 
of the population are self-motivated achievers, then one might reasonably 
infer that this type of individual exists in greater density in the Marine 0 
Corps than in the general population. 
Leading from this inference then, it appears that many self-motivated 
achievers, faced with the draft, have previously chosen to enlist in the 
Marine Corps. This does not imply that he has enlisted only in the Marine 
Corps, but does suggest that his presence there is hi gher than might be 
expected. No data is available yet to suggest his reasons for doing so, 
but if one considers the past image and reputation of the Marine Corps, 
one might fairly conclude that some high need achievers find Marine 
selectivity, masculinity and toughness appealing. 
An assumption has to be made somewhere awaiting empirical measure of 
the results of any program. For Marine Corps purposes then, we will 
assume that the self-motivated achiever is the most combat effective Marine; 
that recruiting efforts should be specifically directed toward this per-
sonality type; and that el'll)hasis upon the variety of characteristics 
comprising his profile will carry across the spectrum of individual differ-
ences, prompting him to vol unteer. 
Yet, there are further facts to assist this analysis . If we review 
the attitudinal characteristics, we see this type expressing himself al-
most exclusively in intrinsic tenns. That is, as demonstrated by his 
characteristics, he is an intrinsically oriented individual, primarily 
concerned with his own self development. If so, he appeared to believe 
he could find greater satisfaction more easily in the Marine Corps, 
given the other alternatives. Coincidentally, or prophetically if you 
prefer, studies conducted after World War II of the Anny indicated that 
their combat effective soldier did not place a great deal of concern 
upon pleasantness of training, attitudes toward superior officers or 
the Army's ability to meet hygiene needs. Actually, there was a negative 
relationship between these attitudes and cont>at effectiveness./ll 
Therefore, while some attempt to meet individual hygienic needs is approp- O 
riate, possibly for retention purposes, there is little suggestion that 
"beer in the barracks 11 , etc. wi 11 prompt the self-motivated achiever 
and our most effective Marine to volunteer. 
If this individual would not have volunteered without the draft, but 
under pressure from the draft chose the Marine Corps, then it may be 
explained by his belief that he could best approximate some degree of 
self-fulfillment in the Marine Corps. Perhaps past recruiting efforts 
emphasizing intrinsic-type factors {11The Marine Corps Builds Men.") may 
have been influential. 
/13 S. A. Stouffer, et. al., The American Soldier: Combat and its 





Obviously no one person exclusively possesses all the above charac-
teristics. The composite profile does not account for individual differ-
ences and gradations in degree of intensity. And as is obvious, the 
Marine Corps cannot hope to attract all self-motivated achievers, for 
some aspects of military service and the nature of the Marine Corps will 
be aversive to many. Is this target then an impossible undertaking? 
Again, McClelland estimated the population density of such types to 
be 10%. If this 10% is a valid figure and if this 10% reflects equally 
within youth between the ages of 18 and 24, the outlook is favorable. 
As young people become an increasingly larger proportion of the nation's 
population and as the military moves more effectively to fill basic hy-
gienic needs, then the Marine Corps personnel needs of 54,000 per year 
consists of approximately 1/2% of 1% of this youth segment. If one uses 
the figure of 1%, then the Marine Corps is attempting to enlist only 10% 
of the 10% of the self-motivated achievers within youth. And this acqui-
sition percentage will decline as youth increases in relation to the 
remainder of the population. From this viewpoint, the selection of this 
element for recruitment targeting does not appear too grandiose. 
Judiciously, the Marine Corps has recently concluded an overhaul of 
its public relations program, particularly its recruiting approach. This 
overhaul (refonnation would be more accurate) is based upon a national 
survey conducted by the J. Walter Thompson Advertising Agency. The 
approach taken was dissimilar to the analysis just presented, but the 
results of the survey are surprisingly supportive of the preceding dis-
cussion and should be presented. 
The surprise jump of the Ar111Y into the heavily paid, prime time, 
television media caught the other services somewhat off guard. Nonethe-
less, however, all have followed through with revised recruiting approaches, 
and none too surprisingly, they all reflect increased emphasis on personal, 
i ntri ns i c motivators. Simultaneously, they al so reflect what appears to 
be a specific attempt to counter the image of organization as depersonaliz-
ing. Consider the following: 
U. S. ArlllY: "Today's Arlll.Y wants to join you. 11 
U. S. Navy: "If you're going to be something, be something special. 11 
U.S. Air Force: 11Find yourself . .. in the United States Air Force." 
In contrast to the above, the repackaged approach of the Marine Corps 
continues traditional emphasis upon intrinsic factors, but capitalizes by 
strongly contrasting itself with the other services' approaches. Contrast 
the above slogans to the following: 
"The Marines are looking for a few good men." 
In fact, the themes and recruiting fonnats of the other services tend 
to ignore their combat nature. Fortunately, they may be amorphous enough 
in size so that this approach is not hannful. This is not the case with 
the Marine Corps of the 1970's, nor the Marine Corps of any era. To 
pretend otherwise would be to transgress the cardinal rule of communicating 
with young people, the necessity for honesty. And while room for doubt 
might be acceptable to the other services, the Marine Corps must be bluntly 
honest. There can be no misgivings about the harsh realities of a small , 
highly trained, mobile combat force. Such realities have to be communic-
ated as a challenge, not disguised by a whitewash of vague promises for 
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unrestricted self-fulfillment. There is opportunity for self-fulfillment 
within the Marine Corps (this must also be communicated), but only actually 
within or as part of the Corps. 
There are few qualms in this revised approach, and unburdened organi-
zational conscience may be enjoyed since input requirements are relatively 
small. However, the hope exists that this contrast will produce excessive 
response which will allow, in turn, the refinement of the selection process. 
The natio nal survey conducted by the Thompson agency identified some 
facts that had to be accepted and acconmodated by the Marine Corps. Of 
these, the most important is that 44% of the youth surveyed considered 0 
the Marine Corps too tough, brutalizing, regimented./14 And this segment 
reflects the results of another survey conducted by Emanual H. Demby, 
in which he identified a trend of increased hostility toward the masculine 
image in his sampling of college males. A percentage similar to the above 
displczys a revised self-concept trending toward feminine values. And 
while Mr. Demby quali fied his findings by specifying that the majority 
were still pat ristically oriented, he also stated that the dynamics are 
in the matristic direction./15 With this increase in feminine attitudes 
then, the decision of the Marine Corps to emphasize the masculine approach 
is not only honest but is also advisable upon review of the existing, 
though limited, studies of conbat effectiveness conducted by the Anny 
following World War II and Korea. The first work by Stouffer, already 
identified, and the effort by Egbert, et . al. after Korea did identify 
that greater masculinity, less emotional sensitivity were characteristics 
of the effective conbat soldier in those wars./16 These results seem to 
be supported by the value placed on combativeness and the accompanying 
history of participation in athletic activity found in the effective 
conbat Marine from Vietnam. 
The Thompson survey found that the majority of young men believed in 
the necessity of maintaining a strong national military to "keep the 
peace11 • Further, the survey also revealed that "hard to get into 11 and 
"quality not quantity 11 scored second only to "nobody likes to fight 11 with 
those men who would consider volunteering. 
The results of the study have produced a revised format to Marine 
Corps recruiting that emphasizes five major approaches. These approaches 
are: 
/14 Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, abstract based upon, 
11Exploratory Study of Attitudes of Men of Draft Age Towards the Military 
in General and the Marine Gorps in Particular, 11 J. Walter Thompson Co., 
December 1970. (Hereafter referred to as Abstract . ) 
/15 Emanual H. Demby, IJAll the lonely People," from .. Proceedings of 
the 24th Annual Conference on Public Opinion Research," Public Opinion 
Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3, Fall 1969, pp. 449-450. 
/16 R. L. Egbert, et. al., •Fighter I: A Study of Effective and In-
effectTve Combat Perfonners, i:i-Special Report 13, U.S. Aney Leadership 
Human Research Unit (Human Resources Research Office), Presidio of Monterey, 
California, March 1958. 
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The resulting products from these five major areas are: 
"Nobody 1 i kes to fight but someone has to know how. The 
Marines are looking for a few good men.11 
O "If we weren't hard to get into, we wouldn't be Marines. 
0 
The Marines are looking for a few good men." 
"Marines are a band of brothers. The Marines are looking 
for a few good men. 11 
"The Marines are looking for a few good men who want to leam. 11 
11 The Marines are 1 ook in g for a few good men who want to fly. 0 
"Join the Red, White and Blue. The Marines are looking for 
a few good men." 
Through all the approaches, the basic theme is emphasized: 
The Marines ... (tells who) 
Are Looking •.. (selective and searching) 
For a Few . .. (emphasizes the selectivity, increases the challenge) 
Good Men . . . (describes the need, carries the masculine appeal, and 
implies their own basis of evaluation, again the chal-
1 enge) -Ill 
Throughout the entire approach, selectivity and the corresponding 
challenge are offered, while at the same time continuing to recognize the 
military nature of the Marine Corps and admitting to it. 
These campaign premises were generally based upon favorable response 
by a particular portion of the sample population, who indicated they would 
volunteer for the Marine Corps (7%). It would be appropriate to co~are 
this suggested appeal to a target population identified by corrbat effec-
tiveness characteristics. This comparison contrasts the survey which 
identifies a statistical sample responding favorably to the idea of join-
ing the Marine Corps. 
Reviewing the attitudinal characteristics previously presented indi-
cates that, whether intended or not, the new approach to Marine Corps 
recruiting should strongly appeal to characteristics which describe the 
self-motivated achiever. All the revised appeals challenge masculinity 
and emphasize selectivity. Therefore, the fundamental approach appears 
sound and correctly pointed. In order to further refine this approach to 
be more specific, compare the attitudes of the cont>at effective Marine in 
relation to the characteristics of the self-motivated achiever. 
In reflecting desire to participate in the selection of goals, the 
following attitudes may be classified: 
Ill Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Abstract, pp. B6-8. 
55 
Some degree of uncertainty concerning the Marine Corps1 interest 
in personal goals. 
Marine Corps interested in teaching men required skills, but many 
men are not adequately trained for routinely encountered jobs. 
Marine Corps did not give sufficient explanation for things it 
required a man to do. 
Harsh discipline not a requisite for good combat performance. 
In reflecting the characteristic of setting moderate or realistic 
goals, the following attitudes may be classified: 
Realistic expectations concerning recruit training. 
Did not consider the Marine Corps too soft, 
Desired to participate in Marine Corps endorsed activitY. 
Valued combativeness. 
Chose special forces type duties, infantry not included in last 
choice~ -
Moderate, did not either COIJllletely agree or disagree with state-
ments about the Marine Corps. 
And finally, in reflecting the requirement for immediate feedback, 
the following attitudes may be classified: 
Wanted more recognition for individual achievement. 
Wanted to be recognized for efforts. 
The only attitude characteristic that has been excluded from the above 
list is that which states the individual would not have.j)ined without pres-
sure from the draft. That brings us back to the main theme, how to enlist 
this man without pressure from the draft. 
Perhaps the fact that the most effective Marine volunteered only to 
avoid the draft might be due to past recruiting techniques. Those facets 
of Marine Corps life which would satisfy the more negative attitudes listed 
have not been properly emphasized in recruiting or in Marine Corps policy. 
This paper is not intended to address the subject of retention, and here 
we get dangerously close. However, the vehicles for eliminating some of 
the dissatisfactions expressed do exist in the Marine Corps, and perhaps 
increased emphasis upon them might be timely. Needless to say, honesty 
is the keyword, and if a recruiting pitch projects certain activities, 
they must exist. Therefore we encounter a two-sided coin. To emphasize a 
certain aspect of Marine Corps life in recruiting requires its existence. 
Therefore, recomrrendations for revision or refinement of recruiting em-
phasis must reflect reality. If not, then such emphasis needs to be 
incorporated. 
Once again, reference will be made to the characteristics of the 
combat effective Marine. In so doing, one makes another assumption, 
that the attitudes reflective of the combat Marine were generally present 
prior to his enlistment and were only somewhat influenced by recruit 






attitudes formulated in recruit training do not correlate with effective-
ness./!§. Reflecting previously mentioned caution, the themes reconmended 
will attempt to appeal to a variety of characteristics in order to avoid 
unnecessary overgeneralization. Each will be designed to emphasize one 
personal aspect of the target population and the appeal will be broad 
enough to encompass a wide range of personalities, but conmonly the self-
motivated achiever. They are all compatible to the revised format of 
Marine Corps recruiting and follow: 
l. Goal Selection 
110 u r best ideas come from Marines. 11 
"Set your sights as high as you dare. 11 
"Marines don•t have to ask why, they know." 
"The Marines are looking for a few good men who can think 
for themselves. 11 
2. Realistic Goals 
"There's only so much one man can do; it's just that 
Marines do more." 
"Being 'first to fight' is demanding; we don't pretend 
it isn't." 
"The Marines are looking for a few good men not afraid to 
say 1no 1 to themselves." 
3. Lack of Rigid Control: 
11The Marines are looking for a few good men who don't always 
have to be told 1how1 • 11 
"The Marines are looking for a few good men who can make 
decisions on their own.11 
"The Marines are looking for a few good men who can think 
for th ems el ves. 11 
4. Recognition: 
"Excellence is our standard; so is recognition." 
"Ment>e rs of a team know when they' ve done we 11 . 11 
"Our Marines are special; we note it. The Marines are 
looking for some more good men. 11 
"When another Marine says you've done well, believe him." 
In each of the above appeals, an attempt was made to capture the 
attention and imagination of the self-motivated achiever, to communicate 
that he has a real place in the Marine Corps. Though he may not know 
that he is such a person, the basic aspects of his personality should 
respond favorably to one or more of the above. For those almost possess-
; ng such ch aracteri sti cs, this approach s ti 11 should have appea 1 , s i nee 
/l8 George A. Clum, Anne Heiberg and D. M. Kole, "Attitude Change 
in Marine Recruit Training, 11 Psychological Reports, February 1969, 
pp. 311-318. 
57 
the Marine Corps is the only service to highlight it. Marines need not 
be concerned with the entire II flower generation". On the contrary, 
Marines should not want to be. The problem of appealing to a broad base 
of contemporary American society in order to meet force requirements is 
one for the other services. If Marines can be exclusive due to the rel a-
tively small input requirement, then it would be foolish not to point a 
recruiting approach at those who would be expected to be combat effective 
Marines. Taking and maintaining the basic approach already chosen and 
refining it toward this specific target population results in a quasi-
saturation approach to this segment of the population. Its effectiveness 
can only be revealed by time. Similarly, the accuracy of previously 
stated assumptions will require time to validate. But for the present, 
it appears as if the Marine Corps should take its own advice and "1 oak 
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The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., 
addressed the Marine Corps officers attending the U.S. Naval Postgraduate 
School during his visit there on 13 May 1971. During the course of his 
talk, he discussed his policy regarding the recruiting of new Marines. 
As he explained it, the recruiting program is being based on honesty, 
"Only the best can make it, only the best need apply." The attraction 
is to be one of 11challenge and personal satisfaction." The Commandant 
stated that a national opinion survey of service-eligible men, conducted 
for the Marine Corps, reflected that 44% of those men thought the Marine 
Corps was 11too tough, 11 that 18% would volunteer for the Anned Forces and 
that of this 18%, 7% would volunteer to join the Marine Corps. The 
Co11111andant stated that if this 7% did enlist, then the Corps would have 
to start refusing some men since the 7% nunber would be above that nunt>er 
required to maintain a peace-time strength of 206,000 officers and men. 
This paper is primarily concerned with the enlisted retention prob-
lem that has recently developed, resulting from President Nixon's decision 
to do away with the draft and rely upon volunteers to maintain the level 
of the Armed Services. It is hoped by some Congressmen that the present 
draft law which is due to expire 30 June 1971 will not be extended for 
two years. If this law is not extended, the Services, including the 
Marine Corps, would soon be confronted with an awful truth - would they 
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be able to obtain sufficient numbers of recruits once the threat of the 
draft had passed? Without question, the majority of young men who recent-
ly joined any branch of the Service did so knowing that if they did not 
select a particular Service, they would be drafted, thereby forfeiting 
their choice. How many men would voluntarily have enlisted had they not 
been subject to the draft? There is no definitive answer to that question , 
but it is one thdt the Services are attempting to influence by their re-
cruitment advertising and enticements. 
Hand-in-hand with the recruitment problem is that of retention. 
Why? For every man that leaves the Service after his three or four year 
enlistment expires, another man must be enlisted to fill-in the spot 
vacated by personnel who in turn are moved about to fill the spot vacated 
by the man being discharged. Not only is there one man less required for 
each man who decides to 11stay in" and reenlists, but the man reenlisting 
possesses valuable training and experience that cannot be adequately 
assessed by applying a price tag to it. The man who reenlists is in the 
position of being a leader and instructor of others; the man who has just 
recently joined is a trainee, a follower; he has a long way to go before 
he i s tr uly producti·ve. In a sense, the relationship between recruitment 
and retention is a dependent one, yet, at the same time, it is independent. 
If the recruitment program is overwhelmingly successful, then the retention 
program need not be so successful since the input is balancing the output. 
Similarly, if the retention program is highly successful , then the numbers 
of new recruits required will be reduced, hence the recruitment drive can 
be decreased in its intensity. But these actions are also independent 
since, from the recruiting side, it is most desirable to have more men 
wanting to join than there are quotas available. Additionally, if the 
reenlistment program is effective, then there will be many who desire to 
"remain in" or reenlist. In each situation, there would be more men than 
needed, necessitating a screening or selection process whereby the best 
qualified are selected for enlistment or reenlistment. In this regard, 
the relationship between the two programs is independent and the one I 
am certain which will be strived for by the Marine Corps. 
It is my contention that those enlisted men whose time in the Marine 
Corps is approaching an end and who have decided not to reenlist, will 
not do so even when offered any of the following existing inducements: 
l. Variable Reenlistment Bonus (VRB) - which could go to a maximum 
of $10,000 if the man possessed one of numerous Military Occupational 
Specialties (MOS) that fell into a maximum VRB payment status and reenlisted 
for six years, or 
2. a choice of duty stations to be transferred to after reenlisting, 
or 
3. select another MOS to be fonnally trained in, then work in that 
specialty . 
Additionally, it is nonnal procedure to offer the man two of the 
above inducements since the VRB is provided automatically upon reenlisting, 
the amount of money involved depending upon the number of years that he 
reenlists and the MOS that he possesses. Therefore, either the choice of 
duty station or the training would be offered in conjunction with the VRB. 
Notwithstanding the attractiveness of the offers, my contention re-
mains that unless the man has previously made up his mind to reenlist, 







he intends to reenlist, and the inducements offered above are not the 
reason, then the possibility is strong that, (1) he decided before enter-
in~ the Marine Corps that he would make the Marine Corps a career; or 
(2) joined the Marine Corps with the intent of remaining in for that one 
enlistment (anywhere from two to six years) but changed his mind at some 
point in time after joining; or (3) joined the Marine Corps undecided 
about making it a career or leaving when his enlistment expired, but 
at some point in time subsequent to his enlisting, decided to reenlist 
and make the Marine Corps a career. 
It is these last two areas that interest me because as an adjunct 
to my earlier contention regarding the ineffectiveness of the inducements 
to reenlist, i.e., VRB, choice of duty station, or retraining, I further 
submit that the man in this situation has changed his mind and decided 
to reenlist because, expressing it in the simplest tenns, he 11likes the 
life." But what was it that happened to him that first caused him to 
alter his outlook regarding making a career of the Marine Corps? I do 
not have the answer as to what that 11it 11 was, or is, however, it is my 
intent to discuss a few areas that I consider extremely important to 
retention of enlisted personnel. 
Participation 
The first of these areas is participation, and I expressly mean 
verbal participation, verbal participation by the enlisted men, all the 
men, regarding activities of the unit. Let me provide a bit of clarifica-
tion - I do not consider it necessary or appropriate that every last 
function involving the unit be discussed with the men, but there are many 
subjects that can be and routinely have not. The thought that pervades, 
and has, is that the men will be told what 11they 11 need to know about 
everything. Not so anymore! Let them ask questions to which honest and 
sincere replies are given. These men are part of the unit, and have a 
need to know what is going on. Additionally, the young men of today 
want to know and they do not want the infonnation couched in neat cliches 
or arrbiguities. In effect, "tell it like it is 11 would summarize how they 
desire the information. 
What can be discussed with them to overcome their reticence and 
arouse their interest? For example, future activities of the unit, after-
hour education programs, social events, promotion prospects - and here, 
why couldn1 t it be suggested that the men themselves, by organized ballot-
voting, determine which of their peers they feel are the best qualified 
to receive accelerated promotions. Also, information about forthcoming 
new equipment, quotas to technical schools, how the nurrbers of men to work 
in the mess hall is detennined, why guard duty is still maintained even 
though the unit is in garrison 11in 11 the United States. There are many 
areas, those mentioned are but a few that could be considered. 
An important point: it is standard practice for a Company Gunnery 
Sergeant in the Marine Corps to assemble the men in a forniation at least 
once daily and, via a one-way conmunication net, tell them of any signif-
icant information. In the above discussion of verbal participation, I 
visualize an area where the men can be comfortable, whether it is relax-
ing in the shade or resting in the mess hall, but they are not standing 
at attention. Their questions are sought and the atmosphere is one of 
relaxation, not tension. 
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There is a great deal of evidence for the fact that participation 
satisfies the needs of the participant. French, Israel and As have 
hypothesized that : 
110ne effect of a high degree of parti ci pat ion by workers in de-
cisions concerning their own work will be to strengthen thei r 
motivation to carry out these decisions. 11 
They also say: 
11When management accords t he workers participation in any important 
decision, it implies that workers are intelligent, competent, and 
valued partners. Thus part icipation directly affects such aspects 
of worker-management relations as the perception of being valued, 
the perception of col'OOlon goals, and cooperation. It satisfies such 
important social needs as the need for recognition and appreciation 
and the need for independence. These satisfactions and in addition 
the improvements in their jobs that are introduced through partici-
pation lead to higher job satisfactions . "/l 
Herzberg, Mausner and Snyderman in their book, The Motivation to 
Work, state that: 
"Many specific investigations, too nunerous to cite, proved the 
point that workers liked t o have a voice in the decisions that 
affected them and that they responded with positive emotions when 
they were treated as individual human beings rather than as an 
undifferentiated mass. 11/'f.. 
Maier points out that there are a nunber of different sources of 
satisfaction involved in the democratic approach to leadership. Partici-
pants derive ego satisfaction and pleasure from solving problems, from 
working in cooperating groups, and from determining their own behavior 
rather 1han being forced to do something./3 
Vroom adds that: -
11Persons derive satisfaction from successfully carrying out decisions 
in which they have participated and the more an individual has 
influenced a joint decision, the more satisfaction he obtains from 
its success fu 1 execution. 11 / .! 
Additionally, Vroom, in a portion of his book, Work and 1'tltivation, 
briefly describes the findi1g; of nine investigations and studies that 
/1 French, J . R. P. , Jr . , J. Israel and D. As, "An Experiment on 
Participation in a Norwegian Factory," Human Relations, Vol. 13, No. 1, 
February 1960, p. 5. 
/2 Herzberg, Frederick, Bernard Mausner and Barbara Snydennan. 
The MotTvation to Work, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc .• 1959, p. 127. 
/1 Maier, Norman R.F., Principles of Human Relations . New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1951, pp. 256-258. 
/4 Vroom, Victor H. , Some Personality Determinants of the Effects 
of PartTcipation. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 









concerned themselves with influence in decision making. At one point 
he states 11there is fairly clear-cut evidence that people who are satis-
fied with their jobs tend to report that they have greater opportunity 
to influence decisions which have effects on them. 11/5 In the very next 
sentence though, he states that the inverse of that statement is not true 
and expresses it thusly: 11 ••• this evidence cannot be regarded as proof 
that greater influence increases job satisfaction and that 1 ess infl u-
ence decreases job satisfaction. 11 
Recognition 
A second area of importance to the subject of retention is that of 
recognition. How may times have we, ourselves, had the thought that the 
boss never says "thanks" or 11well done,11 but only finds fault with how 
long the job took? And who, in most cases, actually accomplishes the 
job - the men. They are the ones who have produced, have completed the 
work. It is they who need recognition. It can be far extra effort on 
their part in getting a job completed, for continued outstanding work, 
or for an individual completing an extension course, and on and on. 
Recognition has routinely been made by promoting a man meritoriously, 
but this man has usually been an achiever at everything he does. The 
promotion is really not timely, but a sort of reward long after he has 
been recognized. How about recognition that is timely - a ninety six 
hour pass because of his special efforts and not just to one man, but to 
all men deserving of it? How about recognition in the fonn of a Company 
or Unit Mast with appropriate entries in his service record book? A 
Battalion or Regimental Conmanding Officer's Mast could also be arranged 
with the added benefit of the Conmander citing the man. These mast 
procedures - recognition of a man doing good work - are in our system 
but are niggardly doled out. The circumstances under which they are 
awarded need to be reviewed and with more awareness for them evidenced 
by officers at all levels. 
Herzberg, et. al., found that after achievement, recognition was the 
second most stated item of mention by the 203 engineers and accountants 
interviewed in their Pittsburgh study. Their major criterion for that 
category was some act of recognition to the person speaking to them. The 
recognition could come from most anyone,whether it was from a supervisor, 
anyone in management, or from a fellow worker. A key point made regarding 
the effectiveness of recognition was that there be some achievement as a 
basis for the recognition./6 
In his book, Work and the Nature of Man, Herzberg, in discussing 
motivation factors, identifies achievement, recognition and responsibility 
as the most consistent in producing job satisfaction. He states that 
11these three describe accomplishment, reinforcement for accomplishment 
and increasing challenge - the basic ingredients of psychological growth."/l 
/5 Vroom, Vactor H., Work and Motivation. New York: John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc., 1964, p. 118. 
/§_ QE.. cit., Herzberg, Mausner and Snyderman, p. 60. 
/7 Herzberg, Frederic, Work and the Nature of Man, Cleveland, Ohio: 
The World Publishing Company, 1966, p. 127. 
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Maslow, in his article, 11A Theory of Human Motivation," addressed 
the subject of recognition when he discussed the self esteem needs. With 
a few pathological exceptions everyone in our society has a desire or 
need for a stable, firmly based, (usually) high evaluation of themselves; 
for self respect, or self esteem, and for the esteem of others. By 
finnly based self esteem he means, that which is soundly based upon real 
capacity, achievement and respect from others. Maslow classifies these 
needs into two subsets: 
First: the desire for strength, achievement, adequacy, independence 
and freedom, and for confidence in the face of the world; 
Second: a desire for reputation or prestige, recognition, attention, 
importance or appreciation. 
He concludes that portion by stating that: 11Satisfaction of the 
self-esteem need leads to feelings of self-confidence, worth, strength, 
capability and adequacy of being useful and necessary in the world. 
Thwarting of these needs produces feelings of inferiority, of weakness 
and of helplessness. These feelings in turn give rise to either basic 
discouragement or else compensatory or neurotic trends. 0 /1!_ 
Satisfactory Home Life 
My last subject for discussion is the one that I consider the most 
significant if the Marine is a married man and it should be noted that 
the majorityof those men who reenlist in the Marine Corps, are married. 
I identify this subject area as satisfactory home life. 
One vital aspect contributing to a satisfactory home life for our 
young married Marine will be the success of the relationship that his 
wife enjoys with other wives of junior enlisted men and non-conmissioned 
officer (NC01 s) from his organization. In too many cases, the wife of a 
young Private, Private First Class, or Lance Corporal is forgotten. It 
is known that Pfc Jones, for example, is married and his wife is with 
him and that they are living in a government trailer or a one-room apart-
ment in tOl/n, but in most cases that is all that is known. What is 
forgotten by the older NC01s is that when they were younger married 
Marines, they also had it rough. Their money didn't go quite as far 
as they hoped it would and their friends were, in most cases, limited 
to their neighbors or close friends of the husband. Time has passed, 
promotions have come, and the early married days are faintly remembered. 
But their problems were numerous and a helping hand then, during those 
early days, would have been welcomed. It is here, a 11helping hand," 
that can be put forth to help the wife. Suffice it to say, our Marine 
is a team-man, not only the Marine Corps team but as part of the husband-
wife team, and if the wife-half of that team is unhappy with any aspect 
of the Marine Corps, then no matter how enthused or motivated he is to 
reenlist, this young Marine may get out of the Marine Corps when his 
enlistment is up. Command attention must be involved in ensuring that 
groups are formed to provide assistance to the wife-member of the team 
by having a wife of a junior NCO in the Marine1 s organization visit her 
/8 Maslow, Abraham H., 11A Theory of Human Motivation, 11 Psychological 









within a few days after their arrival in the area. The visiting wife can 
advise her of such wifely infonnation as co1T1T1issary hours, answer questions 
regarding its size and adequacy; hospital hours and the procedure there; 
telephone numbers of other wives in her husband's unit; telephone numbers 
of wives to call if 9'\e has any questions, needs help, needs someone to 
just talk to, needs a ride, and so forth. The unit could have a collec-
tion of baby clothes donated by members who no longer have need of them, 
also a list of fellow Marines who can loan pots or pans and other items. 
Additionally, the "helping hand" conmittee would follow up the first 
visit with telephone calls and repeat visits. It is very obvious that 
unit social activities could evolve from the efforts of this conrnittee. 
A great deal of potential here! 
So why is all this effort important? As mentioned earlier, this 
young Marine is going to leave the Marine Corps if his wife is not 
happy with it. If she is made aware that other Marine wives care about 
her and are willing to help her, that she is an important member of the 
11team,11 then her feelings regarding her husband reenlisting will certainly 
be towards the favorable side. 
One aspect that must not be overlooked is that not only is our 
Marine young, but so is his wife. It would not be an overstatement to 
say that she is highly susceptible to first impressions. If her arrival 
in the area is shortly followed by a visit from a wife of a Marine, one 
in her husband's unit, and that wife is there to help her, just imagine 
the favorable impression that will result. And subsequent visits and/or 
telephone calls will tend to reenforce this favorable impression. 
Herzberg, et. al., discussed the effects of various factors on a 
man's outlook regarding his work and place of employment.Ii Some of 
these factors are called 11hygiene11 factors, some 11motivators 11 and some 
11dissatisfiers. 11 I have been unable to locate any specific reference by 
Herzberg regarding the influence that a wife has on ner husband's job 
attitudes. It would appear that there is no denying that such influence 
is very pertinent and could be overwhelming. Herzberg has stated that 
job dissatisfiers deal with the factors that define the job context and 
that poor working conditions, bad company policies and administration, 
and bad supervision will lead to job dissatisfaction. Having to work 
under such negative conditions would lead to an unhappy employee. By 
the same token, if these conditions were to become satisfactory, we 
are not assured that our unhappy employee would become happy - he cou1d 
still remain unhappy. It would appear to be a rational thought, however, 
that the probability of having a happy employee is increased if the con-
ditions that encourage job dissatisfaction are not present. While we 
are not sure, we would certainly have removed a major obstacle to satis-
faction attainment. 
With the above in mind, I believe that Herzberg would say that (1) 
the influence that a wife has on a young man remaining at his present 
place of employment is stronger than that of the man; (2) if the man 
enjoyed his work and job surroundings, but his wife did not like certain 
aspects of the company association, then it would be a "no contest" as 
to whether the man would remain with that company. He would probably 
/'l QQ.. Cit., Herzberg, Mausner and Snyderman, pp. 111-112. 
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also say that what has been sai.d previousll about those factors that 
lead to a man having positive job attitudes can be considered partially 
applicable to his wife as well. By her receiving attention from the 
wives, which could be correlated to receiving recognition, she will have 
i11111ediately received a favorable impression of her husband's unit and 
the Marine Corps. Her attitude towards the unit and the Marine Corps 
will tend to be favorable. 
Dr. Herzberg would probably conclude by saying that such attention 
to the Marine's wife, in itself, can provide no assurance that she might 
get a favorable attitude towards the unit or the Marine Corps. 
I believe that Maslow would address the relationship of the wife to 
the man in regards to his employment from the human need hierarchy. He 
would probably say that man is a perpetually wanting animal and that his 
drive or needs cannot be considered in isolation; that all of his drives 
are related to the satisfaction or dissatisfaction that he receives from 
other drives. If the man is aware that his wife is unhappy because of 
what his unit did or did not do, then that unhappiness is partially taken 
over by him as he attempts to placate his wife. Until that need, not only 
that of his wife, but his a1s·o, has been satisfied, his other drives and 
motivations will be impeded. Maslow would continue by saying that 
"another peculiar characteristic of the human organism when it is domi-
nated by a certain need is that the whole philosophy of the future tends 
also to change./10 TherP.fore, it would be possible for a young wife to 
receive an initiafbad impression of the Marine Corps which would be 
transferred to her husband. From that period on, his attitude concerning 
the Marine Corps would possibly be a negative one. 
Maslow would also probably say that the wife must be considered 
almost as much as the man. If her needs are satisfied, especially her 
potential ones of acceptance and recognition by the other wives, the 
transfer to her husband will be in the positive vice negative vein, 
allowing his drives to continue on as opposed to stagnating. 
Summary 
As any person who has served in a branch of the Armed Forces knows, 
the threat of the draft has been the one single and biggest factor which 
caused rren to voluntarily enlist. By enlisting, they were able to select 
the particular branch that they wanted. Had they been drafted, they would 
have had little or no choice regarding which Service would have claimed 
them. The draft threat will soon be a thing of the past and the Services 
already have launched aggressive recruitment campaigns with that in mind. 
This paper has directed itself at the retention aspect of the Marine 
Corps but it is applicable to any Service. The author believes that in 
many cases a man will reenlist in the Marine Corps even though, when he 
first joined, he was undecided about what he would do when his enlistment 
expired or in some cases, knew that he would only remain in for one en-
listment. During that first enlistment something happened that caused 
him to 11li ke the 1 ife. 11 How wonderful if that 11it 11 could be successfully 
i denti fi ed! 











Three areas have been discussed that should be implemented if a step 
forward in retention is to be made. Some of these areas, I suspect, are 
receiving attention now. These areas are not new but the awareness of 
them is apparently new to many. These areas can be further identified 
by saying that the men should receive as much consideration as we, our-
selves, would like to receive. No one has ever gotten into serious 
trouble if the purpose of his actions was to improve the situation for 
his men. By becoming more aware of the needs and desires of our men, 
the men will know that they are a vital part of the Marine Corps team. 
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